




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
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


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
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
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
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
Diversity, Tragedy, and the Schools
Diane Ravitch

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A CONSIDERED OPINION

Diane Ravitch

Diversity, Tragedy, and the Schools



As U.S. immigration has surged over the past quarter-century, educators have been developing a new response to demographic diversity in the classroom. The public schools have turned away from their traditional emphasis on assimilating newcomers into the national “melting pot.” Instead, they have put a new emphasis on multicultural education, deemphasizing the common American culture and teaching children to take pride in their racial, ethnic, and national origins. In the wake of the terrorist attacks on New York City and Washington last September 11, however, the tide may be turning away from multiculturalism. Americans’ remarkable display of national unity in the aftermath of the attacks could change the climate in the nation’s schools as much as it has the political climate in Washington.



HERMAN FARRER

Diane Ravitch is a nonresident senior fellow in the Brookings Governmental Studies program and research professor at New York University.

absorb millions of newcomers. The public schools took on the job of educating and preparing them for social, civic, and economic participation in the life of the nation.

What did the public schools in those early years do about their new clientele? First, they taught them to speak, read, and write English—a vital necessity for a successful transition into American society. Because many children served as translators for their parents, these skills were valuable to the entire family in negotiating with employers, shops, and government agencies. The schools also taught habits of good hygiene (a matter of public health), as well as appropriate self-discipline and behavior. More than the three “Rs,” schools taught children how to speak correctly, how to behave in a group, how to meet deadlines, and how to dress for different situations (skills needed as much by native-born rural youth as by immigrant children). Certainly, the schools taught foreign-born children about American history (especially about national holidays, the Constitution, the Revolutionary War, and the Civil War), with a strong emphasis on the positive aspects of the American drama. They also taught children about the “American way of life,” the habits, ideals, values, and attitudes (such as the American spirit of individualism) that made their new country special. If one could sum up this education policy, it was one that celebrated America and invited newcomers to become full members of American society.

During the late 1960s and early 1970s, assimilation came to be viewed as an illegitimate, coercive imposition of American ways on unwitting children, both foreign-born and nonwhite. With the rise of the black separatist movement in 1966, black nationalists such as Stokely Carmichael began inveighing against racial integration and advocating community control of public schools in black neighborhoods. In response, many black educators demanded African-American history, African-American heroes, African-American literature, and African-American celebrations in the public schools. In the 1970s, the white ethnic revival followed the black model, and soon government was funding celebrations of ethnic heritage in the schools. By the mid-1970s, just as immigration was beginning to increase rapidly, the public

schools no longer focused on acculturating the children of newcomers to American society. Instead, they encouraged children to appreciate and retain their ethnic and racial origins.

The expectation that the public schools will teach children about their racial and ethnic heritage has created enormous practical problems. First, it has promoted the belief that what is taught in school will vary in response to the particular ethnic makeup of the school. Thus, a predominantly African-American school will learn one set of lessons, while a predominantly Hispanic school will learn yet another, and an ethnically mixed school will learn—what? Second, schools have begun to lose a sense of a distinctive American culture, a culture forged by people from many different backgrounds that is nonetheless a coherent national culture. No state in the nation requires students to read any particular book, poem, or play. Today schools are uncertain about how to teach American history, what to teach as “American” literature, and how to teach world history without omitting any corner of the world (many children learn no world history). Third, the teaching of racial and ethnic pride is itself problematic, as it appears to be a continuation in a new guise of one of the worst aspects of American history.

From our public schools’ experiences over the past century, we have learned much about the relative advantages and disadvantages of assimilationism and multiculturalism in the public schools.

Assimilation surely has its strengths. A democratic society must seek to give every young person, whether native-born or newcomer, the knowledge and skills to succeed as an adult. In a political system that relies on the participation of informed citizens, everyone should, at a minimum, learn to speak, read, and write a common language. Those who would sustain our democratic life must understand its history. To maximize their ability to succeed in the future, young people must also learn mathematics and science. Tailoring children’s education to the color of their skin, their national origins, or their presumed ethnicity is in some fundamental sense contrary to our nation’s founding ideals of democracy, equality, and opportunity.

And yet we know that assimilationism by itself is an inadequate strategy for American public education, for two reasons. First, it

ignores the strengths that immigrants have to offer; and second, it presumes that American culture is static, which is surely not true. When immigrants arrive in America, they tend to bring with them, often after an emotionally costly journey, a sense of optimism, a strong family and religious tradition, and a willingness to work hard—values and attitudes that our society respects, but that affluence and media cynicism have eroded among many of our own citizens.

But neither is “celebrating diversity” an adequate strategy for a multiracial, multi-ethnic society like ours. The public schools exist to build an American community, to help both newcomers and native-born children prepare for adulthood as fellow citizens. Strategies that divide children along racial and ethnic lines encourage resentment and alienation rather than mutual respect. The ultimate democratic lesson is human equality, and the schools must teach our children that we are all in the same boat, all members of one society, regardless of race, ethnicity, or place of origin.

We learned that lesson the hardest way possible on September 11, when thousands of people from many countries died together in a single tragedy.

How will America’s schools respond in the days ahead? It seems clear that they must make a pact with the children in their care. They must honor the strong and positive values that the children’s families bring to America, and in return they must be prepared to give the children access to the best of America’s heritage.

America’s newcomers did not come to our shores merely to become consumers. They came to share in our democratic heritage and to become possessors of the grand ideas that created and sustained the democratic experiment in this country for more than two centuries. They too have a contribution to make to the evolving story of our nation. Whether they do so will depend in large part on whether our educational system respects them enough to help them become Americans.

The terrible events of this past fall have shown that Americans of all races and ethnic groups share a tremendous sense of national spirit and civic unity. They recognize that, whatever their origins, they share a common destiny as Americans. America’s schools should honor that reality. ■

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DIV ERS ITY

Akbar Ahmed, a distinguished professor of Islamic studies and international relations at American University in Washington, tells the story of a young relative of his named Tariq. Tariq's father was a successful Pakistani banker who, 10 or 15 years ago, resettled his family in New Jersey to give his children a better life. "For them, America was a dream," Ahmed says. "They worked so hard." Tariq arrived still a boy and grew up to become a good Muslim and also a good American. He attended university here, married, and, in his early 20s, went to work for an investment company, the sort of place that launches many a prosperous career. The firm's offices were in the World Trade Center. Tariq was last heard from when he called his father to say he had seen the first tower collapse.

Many innocent Muslims, American and foreign, died on September 11. "An Attack on the World," headlined the *Washington Post*, noting that more than 50 countries had lost citizens in the twin towers. The list of countries whose people were murdered began with Argentina and ended with Zimbabwe. For Americans, this was more than a fact. It was a point of pride. More even than that, it was a national characteristic that gave the American system a moral edge in the struggle

as a problem to be solved or managed. America, by contrast, views diversity as something to be embraced for the cultural and economic benefits it brings—even, for many liberals and multiculturalists, as an end in itself, an ideal. This is not only exceptional, it is new, even in America. In the 1920s and 1930s, H. L. Mencken reveled in ethnic and cultural stereotypes and thought nothing of referring to native-born Americans as, say, Irish or Italian, but it would not have occurred to him to make diversity a goal of public or private policy.

In his book *On Toleration*, the political philosopher Michael Walzer sorts tolerant regimes into several types. Prominent among them are the multinational empire, which, like the British and Ottomans, gives considerable local autonomy to ethnic and religious groups provided they don't make trouble; nation-states like France, which publicly and officially enshrine a dominant national culture but leave minorities and dissidents alone; and immigrant societies, which formally proclaim no single ethnic or religious preference and demand merely that everyone tolerate everyone else. Walzer regards America as the world's preeminent example of the immigrant society. And so it was, in Mencken's day and through at least the 1950s. Now, however, it is something more akin to a mul-

n a New America

Charting the Changes

By Jonathan Rauch

that the terrorist attacks sparked. When President Bush went to American mosques and invited American Muslims to the White House, he was not only genuflecting toward Muslim opinion but implicitly explaining why American values were worth defending. America, he was saying, is free, open, and—most important—diverse.

"America is probably the most diverse society on earth; it is certainly the most diverse industrialized one," writes Peter Schuck, in his forthcoming book *Diversity in America: Keeping Government at a Safe Distance* (from which his article in this issue is adapted). "This is true almost regardless of how one defines diversity." Of course, history has thrown up other examples of diverse countries, but in one important respect America today appears to be unique or close to it. Americans do not merely tolerate diversity. As Schuck points out, "We venerate it as a proud element of our national mythos." Schuck contrasts what he calls diversity-in-fact with diversity-as-ideal. Throughout history, most societies have been preoccupied with diversity-in-fact, which they have tended to view

as a problem to be solved or managed. America, by contrast, views diversity as something to be embraced for the cultural and economic benefits it brings—even, for many liberals and multiculturalists, as an end in itself, an ideal. This is not only exceptional, it is new, even in America. In the 1920s and 1930s, H. L. Mencken reveled in ethnic and cultural stereotypes and thought nothing of referring to native-born Americans as, say, Irish or Italian, but it would not have occurred to him to make diversity a goal of public or private policy.

Even so, a new tension now strains multiculturalism. Diversity in America is increasing—increasing, as Kenneth Prewitt argues in the article following, to the point where standard categories of diversity are breaking down. We are becoming so diverse that we are no longer sure what we mean by diversity. Meanwhile, affirmative action, bilingual education, multiculturalism, and other institutions and ideologies of the rainbow society—new though they may seem—are already three decades old. They are beginning to show their age, and a new generation, less burdened by America's history of discrimination, increasingly questions their relevance and effectiveness.

How is diversity changing the country? In light of the changes, what next for policy? In this issue of the *Brookings Review*, an assortment of scholars and analysts considers both questions. Although they do not, and could not, arrive at any one conclusion, they have in common the premise that diversity is not what it was even a decade or so ago. Like the country it shapes and then reshapes, diversity is new every day. ■


Jonathan Rauch, a Brookings writer-in-residence and guest editor of this issue of the Brookings Review, writes for National Journal and the Atlantic Monthly.


Demography, Diversity, and Democracy The 2000

By Kenneth Prewitt

n December 28, 2000, the Census Bureau released the first results of the decennial census completed a few months earlier, announcing, "Never have we been so diverse; never have we been so many; never have we been so carefully measured."

Kenneth Prewitt, director of the U.S. Census Bureau from 1998 to 2001, is dean of the graduate faculty of social research at New School University.





The “never so many” and “never so carefully measured” were front-page news immediately. The national count of 281.4 million persons was the first big story. The total national population had grown more rapidly than expected, and the numerical growth—32.7 million since the 1990 census—was the largest recorded in any decennial census. The related census story was how these 281.4 million people were distributed across the 50 states. As required by the Constitution, that distribution is the basis on which the House of Representatives is apportioned. The winners and losers were the political story. The national count and its political implications were what mattered as the year 2000 came to an end.

In the months that followed, with the release of detailed census data, a story implicit in those early numbers steadily grew more prominent. “Never have we been so diverse” became the big story, and it shows every sign of staying on page one for some time to come.

Falling Birth Rates and Immigration

Each of us telling the story of America’s diversity will enter at a different point. I start with the perhaps unfamiliar term “replacement migration.” As defined in a March 2000 United Nations report, replacement migration is “the international migration that would be needed to offset declines in the size of the population, the declines in the population of working age, as well as to offset the overall aging of a population.”

The term draws attention to below-replacement birth rates, a problem that is especially acute in Europe. The UN projects negative population growth for 31 European nations, with especially dramatic declines for the working-age cohort. For example, under current (median) UN projections, in the next half-century Italy’s population will drop from 57 million to 41 million and the Russian federation’s from 147 million to 121 million—respectively, 28 percent and 18 percent. The replacement migration numbers get very high. To maintain Italy’s working-age population, for example, would require some 370,000

new migrants each year; Germany’s, just short of a half-million (Germany is now debating whether to grant 30,000 or only 20,000 temporary visas for immigrant workers). Population is declining not only in Europe but also in the advanced economies of the Far East, such as South Korea, Hong Kong, and Japan. Japan, for example, expects to drop from 127 million people to 105 million in the first half of the 21st century.

As in other industrialized countries, the native stock in the United States has stopped reproducing at replacement level. But the U.S. adjustment in immigration policy was swift. During the past three decades the U.S. foreign-born population grew at rates not seen since early in the century. Immigration plus higher-than-replacement fertility among the foreign-born added nearly 33 million people to the U.S. population in the past decade, with especially high growth among the working-age cohort. Both low-end workers for service and farm jobs and high-end workers for information technology have flocked to the United States.

Two Centuries of Migration

The foreign-born are now 10 percent of the U.S. population. The proportion itself is not remarkable; numbers that high were common in the late 19th and early 20th centuries. What is new is the demographic composition, a point best made by starting in 1790, when the first census recorded about 1 percent native Indians, 19 percent African slaves, and the remainder European. The Europeans were overwhelmingly from a northwestern corner of Europe—70 percent of the population were English, Welsh, Scottish, and Irish, and 10 percent primarily Dutch and northern German. More to the point, they were overwhelmingly Protestant. This was about to change.

Starting early in the 19th century, Roman Catholics began to dominate immigration flows as the Irish escaped economic deprivation and religious persecution. By 1850 the Roman Catholic Church was the largest denomination in the country (though

RICHARD LAIRD/FPG

still less numerous than all Protestant denominations combined). The next immigrant surge in the 1880s added more Roman Catholics, primarily Italian. Also arriving, for the first time, were large numbers of Eastern Orthodox and Jews when southern and eastern Europe displaced northern Europe as the primary source of immigrants. The change unleashed decades of aggressive populist nativism drawing on deep currents of anti-Catholicism and anti-Semitism.

But the nation worked its way through and around this darker side of a new religious diversity, in the process establishing what perhaps can be called history's first "pan-European nation," a century before the European Union. The First Amendment's careful separation of church and state was critical. It presupposed substantial equality of religious association and allowed for a religious pluralism initially exercised within American Protestantism and then grudgingly extended to Catholics and Jews. This religious inclusion eased the way for the civic embrace of non-Protestant but still European nationalities.

The nation became pan-European, however, at the expense of non-European groups, of whom there was quite an array even in the 19th century. The pre-19th-century groups—Native Indians and African Americans—saw their claims to citizenship and inclusion rejected out-of-hand, the Civil War Amendments notwithstanding. Other non-Europeans were added through conquest: the southwestern Mexican population, Caribbean Islanders, Native Hawaiians and Pacific Islanders, and Native Alaskans. "Coolie" labor brought Asian immigrants to the West Coast, to work the mines and build the railroads. As a narrative about demographic diversity, the 19th century is about more than voluntary immigration; it is about slavery, indentured servitude, imperial wars, and territorial expansion. Civic membership, of course, was largely denied to the non-European groups.

The Census and Racial Classification

Handmaiden to this denial of rights was a racial classification system that grew

with the census. In 1790 the census divided the population into three racial groups: free whites, slaves, all other free persons (the American Indians). In every census thereafter, the population was racially classified, though the categories changed with the times. By 1820 it was necessary to add "free colored persons" to the classification scheme. After the Civil War, interest in shades of color led the census to classify people as mulatto, quadroon, and octoroon. Asians began to appear in census racial categories around the same time. Often this involved confusing nationality with race or ethnicity. Chinese and Japanese were separately counted in 1890. Hindus, here confusing a religion with a race, were counted in 1920. Mexican first appeared in 1930, but was quickly dropped when the government of Mexico complained Mexican was not a race. Mexicans were then counted as white until 1970, when Hispanic origin appears on the census form as an ethnic rather than racial category. Hawaiian and Part Hawaiian appear on the 1960 census form, as do Aleut and Eskimo.

Classification separated those entitled to civic participation from those whose national origin, race, or ethnicity was cause for exclusion. The slave system, the relocation of Indians to reservations, implementation of the separate but equal doctrine, denial of citizenship to Asians, racist immigration quotas in the 1920s, and Japanese-American internment are familiar chapters in this story. From 1790 until the Civil Rights movement, policy designed to protect the numerical and political supremacy of Americans of European ancestry used a classification system that assigned everyone to a discrete racial group.

This racial (and racist) story took an important turn in the 1960s. The Civil Rights movement was built on the promise to end policy based on racial groupings. It celebrated unity, not diversity. But discrimination did not easily give way. And soon the country was enmeshed in the politics of statistical proportionality—equal opportunity became proportionate representation, individual rights became group rights, nondiscrimination became affirmative

action. Institutional racism entered the political vocabulary. Statistical patterns were offered as evidence. A racial classification that had perpetuated discrimination would now end it.

This brings us to Census 2000, which challenges the nation to struggle again with the tension between the universalism promised by the American enlightenment and the realities of differences and diversity.

From Pan-European to Pan-World

The United States, having first painfully become pan-European, will now have to become pan-world.

The labor pool that moved voluntarily from the Old World to the New World during the 19th century was European. Today, it is Asian, Latin American, Caribbean, Middle Eastern, and African—all demographically young regions of the world, with low wage-rates, a combination that generates emigration pressures. Demographically older nations, especially those with high wage-rates, are where the migrants want to go. If restrictive immigration policy tries to overrule these demographic realities, illegal border crossings increase.

A mix of legal and illegal immigration to the United States has transformed our sense of ourselves as "a diverse nation." In 1900, nearly nine of every ten foreign-born in the United States were from Europe; as late as 1960, the share was still three of four. The drop-off thereafter was sharp, as Hispanics and Asians arrived in large numbers. Of the foreign-born today more than half are from Latin America, more than a quarter from Asia. These patterns show no signs of reversal. Lesser but still significant numbers arrive from the Middle East, from Eastern Europe, and from Africa.

These trends have given rise to heavy media description of a more diverse America, with stories foreseeing a majority-minority nation. Setting aside the meaningless of the phrase, and the fact that these stories misinterpret the data when they exclude from the white count the Hispanics who identify themselves as white, the picture of a nation increasingly diverse in its ethnic and

national origin composition is correct. The young are more diverse than the old, giving weight to the assertion that there is no reversal in sight.

Excepting advanced European economies, every region in the world is sending emigrants to the United States. A nation that started as European Protestant, and became Protestant-Catholic-Jewish but still European, is now constructing Hindu temples for Indians, Buddhist temples for Chinese, and Islamic mosques for Arabs, West Africans, and Southeast Asians. Between 1995 and 2000 the number of mosques increased 25 percent, to more than 1,200.

“Mark One or More”:

A Quiet Revolution

However we define demographic diversity—linguistically, culturally, religiously, ethnically—the United States today is the most demographically diverse nation in world history. How will we manage that diversity? Probably not with a policy tool heavily used for 200 years—the racial taxonomy. The taxonomy frequently changed its categories and was used both to discriminate and then to undo discrimination, but it had one constant. It sorted the population into a small number of discrete summary categories: white, black, Native Indian–Native Alaskan, to which more recently were added Asian and Native Hawaiian–Pacific Islander and, starting in 1970, Hispanic as an ethnic category.

Census 2000 revolutionized matters by making multiple-race an option, an option that will now be used across the federal statistical system. The census instruction, “mark one or more,” is the early tremor of an earthquake in political and social life. What for 200 years had been a racial classification based on a handful of discrete groupings suddenly became 63 categories, and, when cross-classified by Hispanic–Not Hispanic, 126 race-ethnic groups. A limited, closed classification became, politically speaking, wide open.

In racial classification, proliferation begets proliferation. On what grounds does the government declare that enough is enough? No scientific

grounds, no political grounds exist. The government will accommodate the demand from groups wanting a separate racial identity—Arab Americans, for example, who only reluctantly accepted the 2000 census form. With continued proliferation will come growing doubts about any racial measurement. Neither biologists nor anthropologists believe race has scientific merit. The frequent changes in how race has been measured across 200 years make the point eloquently. A scientifically grounded classification would not be continually changed depending on prevailing political sentiment.

What, then, is the future of racial measurement and the social policies to which it is anchored? There is no turning back to the simpler, discrete classifications of the 19th and 20th centuries. The current classification has too many categories for race-based policies using statistical proportionality yet too few to accommodate the pressures of identity politics and the desire for separate recognition. The situation is unstable.

Census 2000 puts two issues in play: public awareness of a new, unprecedented diversity and an unstable racial taxonomy. What will most matter is how and how quickly the two become intertwined. Policymakers and statisticians who design future censuses will be pressed by ethnic lobbies, demographers, and indeed common sense to provide data that allow for meaningful generalization about America’s diverse groups—but also to accept that the country’s growing, blended diversity makes such distinctions less administratively useful or sociologically meaningful.

Measurement decisions will not be made in a political vacuum. They will be contested, with outcomes hard to predict. Perhaps the greatest political uncertainty is whether new immigrant groups will want to be separately counted, so as to separately matter, or will choose to

make their way in a manner that blurs boundaries between national origin groups. The hyphenated American was a product of early 20th-century politics, when the idea of subnationalities that were not racially but ethnically defined won broad acceptance. The prominent role of identity politics then came to the fore when statistical proportionality was introduced as an administrative and political tool. Is this our future, now expanded to include the many new nationalities and ethnicities of late 20th-

century immigration? Or will the nation return to an earlier politics focused less on recognition than on redistribution and based more on individual merit, effort, and educational mobility?

The answer will determine how we will measure and sort in censuses to come. My sense is that Census 2000 stumbled upon a reasonable though probably short-term accommodation given the current uncertainties. In today’s America, people are what they say they are. If they say they are black or

white or black and white, who is to judge otherwise? If the newly arrived Nigerians or Somalians insist that they do not belong in the same “race category” as seventh-generation slave descendants, will we force them into that category or allow them their own “African” category? Caught between many crosscurrents, the census kept traditional categories but allowed individuals to choose all that apply (or none). This is a fresh start toward telling us who we think we are. Given that the nature and degree of diversity is changing as well as our understanding of what diversity even is, this is a reasonable short-term strategy. It recognizes the present political realities of race and keeps intact the government’s obligation to police and prevent racial discrimination. And in the longer term, “mark one or more” opens the door to a postracial future. ■

However we
define
demographic
diversity—
linguistically,
culturally,
religiously,
ethnically—
the United
States today
is the most
demographically
diverse nation in
world history.


By Amitai Etzioni

Inventing. Hispanics

A Diverse Minority Resists Being Labeled

Thirty years ago immigrants from Latin America who settled in the United States were perceived in terms of their home nation—as, for example, Cuban Americans or Mexican Americans, just as European newcomers were seen as Italian Americans or Polish Americans. Today the immigrant flow from Central and South America has grown substantially, and the newcomers are known as Hispanics.

Amitai Etzioni is author of The Monochrome Society.



Some observers have expressed concern that efforts to make Hispanics a single minority group—for purposes ranging from elections to education to the allocation of public funds—are further dividing American society along racial lines. But attempts, both incidental and ideological, to forge these American immigrants into a strongly defined minority are encountering an unanticipated problem. Hispanics by and large do not see themselves as a distinct minority group; they do see themselves as Americans.

Hispanics and African Americans

Hispanics are particularly important for understanding the future of diversity in American society. Already they have overtaken African Americans to become the nation's largest minority, and immigration patterns ensure that the number of Hispanics will continue to grow more rapidly than that of African Americans.

U.S. race relations have long been understood in terms of black and white. Until recently, many books on the subject did not even mention other races, or did so only as a brief afterthought. Now recognition is growing that Hispanics are replacing blacks as the primary minority. But whereas blacks have long been raising their political consciousness, Hispanics have only just begun to find their political legs.

Recent increases in minority populations and a decline in the white majority in the United States have driven several African-American leaders, including Jesse Jackson and former New York City Mayor David Dinkins, along with a few Hispanics, such as Fernando Ferrer, a candidate for the 2002 mayoral election in New York City, and some on the white left (writing in *The American Prospect*) to champion a coalition of minorities to unseat the "white establishment" and become the power-holders and shapers of America's future. The coalition's leaders are systematically encouraging Hispanics (and Asian Americans) to see themselves as victims of discrimination and racism—and thus to share the grievances of many African Americans. Whether they will succeed depends much on how Hispanic Americans see themselves and are viewed by others.

Hispanics and the Census

For several decades now, the Census Bureau has been working to make Hispanics into a distinct group and—most recently—into a race. In 1970, a 5 percent sample of households was asked to indicate whether their origin was Mexican, Puerto Rican, Cuban, Central or South American, or other Spanish. But it was only in 1980, that "Hispanics" became a distinct statistical and social category in the census, as all households were asked whether they were of "Spanish/Hispanic origin or descent." Had no changes been made in 1980, we might well have continued to think of Hispanics as we do about other white Americans, as several ethnic groups, largely from Mexico and Cuba.

The next step was to take Hispanics, who were until recently multiple ethnic groups that were considered racially white, and make them into a unique, separate group whose

members, according to the census, "can be members of any race." This unusual status has had several notable results. One is the flurry of headlines following the release of new census data in March 2001 announcing that "California Whites Are a Minority"—even though 59.5 percent of Californians, including many Hispanics, chose white as their race. The only way for whites to be proclaimed a minority in California is for no Hispanics to be counted as white—even those 40 percent, or more than four million people, who specifically marked white as their race on the census form. Another curious result is the awkward phrase "non-Hispanic whites," by which the media now refer to the majority of Americans.

Because of their evolving status in the census, Hispanics are now sometimes treated not as a separate ethnic group but as a distinct race. (Race marks sharper lines of division than ethnicity.) Often, for example, when national newspapers and magazines, such as the *Washington Post* and *U.S. News and World Report*, graphically depict racial breakdowns on various subjects, they list Hispanics as a fourth group, next to white, black, and Asian. Much less often, but with increasing frequency, Hispanics are referred to as "brown" Americans, as in a *Newsweek* article that noted a "Brown Belt" across America. The result is to make the country seem more divided than it is.

Should one mind the way the census keeps its statistics? Granted, social scientists are especially sensitive to the social construction of categories. But one need not have an advanced degree to realize that the ways we divide people up—or combine them—have social consequences. One may care little how the census manipulates its data, but those data are what we use to paint a picture of the social composition of America. Moreover, the census categories have many other uses—for college admissions forms, health care, voting, and job profiles, government budget allocations, and research. And the media use the census for guidance. In short, the census greatly influences the way we see each other and ourselves, individually and as a community.

This is not to suggest that the Census Bureau has conspired to split up the nation. The recategorizations and redefinitions reflect, in part, changes in actual numbers (large increases in the nation's Hispanic population might arguably justify a separate category); in part, efforts to streamline statistics (collapsing half-a-dozen ethnic groups into one); and, in part, external pressures to which all government agencies are subjected. To be sure, the Census Bureau is a highly professional agency whose statistics are set by scientific considerations. But there is as yet no such thing as a government agency that has a budget set by Congress, that needs public cooperation for carrying out its mission, and that is fully apolitical. Likewise, the Office of Management and Budget, which sets the racial categories, is among the less political branches of the White House, yet still quite politically attuned.

Hispanics in Their Own Eyes

How do Hispanics see themselves? First of all, the vast majority prefer to be classified as a variety of ethnic groups rather than as one. The National Latino Political Survey, for example,

found that three out of four respondents chose to be labeled by country of origin, rather than by “pan-ethnic” terms such as “Hispanic” or “Latino.” Hispanics are keenly aware of big differences among Hispanic groups, especially between Mexican Americans (the largest group) and Cuban Americans, the latter being regarded as more likely to be conservative, to vote Republican, to become American citizens, and so on.

America has, by and large, dropped the notion that it will tell you what your race is, either by deeply offensive blood tests or by examining your features and asking your neighbors (the way the census got its figures about race until 1950). We now allow people to indicate which race they consider themselves to be by marking a box on a census form. Many Hispanics resist being turned into a separate race or being moved out of the white category. In 1990, the census allowed people to buy out of racial divisions by checking “other” when asked about their racial affiliation. Nearly 10 million people—almost all of them Hispanics—did so.

When the Census Bureau introduced its “other” category, some African-American leaders objected because, as they correctly pointed out, the resulting diminution in minority figures both curtails numerous public allotments that take race into account and affects redistricting. So the 2000 census dropped “other” and instead allowed people to claim several races (but not to refuse to be racially boxed in). The long list of racial boxes to be checked ended with “some other race,” with a space to indicate what that race was. Many of the 18 million people who chose this category, however, made no notation, leaving their race as they wanted it—undefined.

Of those who chose only “some other race,” almost all (97 percent) were Hispanic. Among Hispanics, 42.2 percent chose “some other race,” 47.9 percent chose white (alone) as their race, 6.3 percent chose two or more races, and 2 percent chose black (alone). In short, the overwhelming majority of Hispanics either chose white or refused racial categorization, clearly resisting the notion of being turned into a separate race.

A Majority of Minorities

As I have shown in considerable detail in my recent book, *The Monochrome Society*, the overwhelming majority of Americans of all backgrounds have the same dreams and aspirations as the white majority. Hispanic and Asian immigrants and their children (as well as most African Americans) support many of the same public policies (from reformed health insurance to better education, from less costly housing to better and more secure jobs). In fact, minorities often differ more among themselves than they do with the white majority. Differences among, say, Japanese Americans and Vietnamese Americans are considerable, as they are among those from Puerto Rico and Central America. (Because of the rapid rise of the African-American middle class, this group, too, is far from monolithic.)

Intermarriage has long been considered the ultimate test of relationships among various groups in American society.

Working together and studying together are considered low indicators of intergroup integration; residing next to one another, a higher one; intermarriage—the highest. By that measure, too, more and more Hispanic (and Asian) Americans are marrying outside their ethnic group. And each generation is more inclined to marry outside than the previous ones.

In the mid-1990s, about 20 percent of first-generation Asian women were intermarried, as compared with slightly less than 30 percent of the second generation and slightly more than 40 percent of the third generation. Hispanic intermarriage shows a similar trend. More and more Americans, like Tiger Woods, have relatives all over the colorful ethnic-racial map, further binding America into one encompassing community, rather than dividing it along racial and ethnic lines.

In short, there is neither an ideological nor a social basis for a coalition along racial lines that would combine Hispanics, Asians, and African Americans against the white majority to fashion a radically different American society and creed.

Hispanics are particularly important for understanding the future of diversity in American society.

Diversity within Unity


Immigrants to America have never been supra-homogenized. Assimilation has never required removing all traces of cultural difference between newcomers and their new homeland. The essence of the American design—diversity within unity—leaves considerable room for differences regarding to whom one prays and to which country one has an allegiance—as long as it does not conflict with an overarching loyalty to America. Differences in cultural items from music to cuisines are celebrated for making the nation, as a community of communities, richer.

Highly legitimate differences among the groups are contained by the shared commitments all are expected to honor: the Constitution and its Bill of Rights, the democratic way of government, peaceful resolution of conflict, and tolerance for differences. These shared bonds may change as new Americans join the U.S. community, but will do so in a largely gradual, continuous, and civil process rather than through rebellion and confrontation. I write “largely” because no country, the United States included, is completely free of troublesome transitions and we have had our share.

No one can be sure what the future holds. A prolonged downward turn in the economy (a centerpiece of most radical scenarios) would give efforts to enlist new immigrants into a majority-of-minorities coalition a better chance of succeeding. But unlike some early Americans who arrived here as slaves, most new immigrants come voluntarily. Many discover that hard work and education do allow them to move up the American economic and social ladders. That makes a radicalization of Hispanics (and Asian Americans) very unlikely. As far as one can project the recent past into the near future, Hispanics will continue to build and rebuild the American society as a community of communities rather than dividing it along racial lines. ■

Arab and Muslim America A Snapshot

By Shibley Telhami



ror; on the other, they were gripped by the haunting fear of their children being humiliated in school for who they are.

Two Partially Overlapping Communities

There is much that's misunderstood about Arabs and Muslims in America. Although the two communities share a great deal, they differ significantly in their make-up. Most Arabs in America are not Muslim, and most Muslims are not Arabs. Most Arab Americans came from Lebanon and Syria, in several waves of immigration beginning at the outset of the 20th century. Most Muslim Americans are African American or from South Asia. Many of the early Arab immigrants assimilated well in American society. Arab-American organizations are fond of highlighting prominent Americans of at least partial Arab descent: Ralph Nader, George Mitchell, John Sununu, Donna Shalala, Spencer Abraham, Bobby Rahal, Doug Flutie, Jacques Nasser, Paul Anka, Frank Zappa, Paula Abdul, among many others. Like other ethnic groups in America, Arabs and Muslims have produced many successful Americans whose ethnic background is merely an afterthought.

Arab Americans now number more than 3 million, Muslims roughly 6 million (though estimates range from 3 million to 10 million). The income of Arab Americans is among the highest of any American ethnic group—second only to that of Jewish Americans. Arab Americans have become increasingly politicized over the years. According to a recent survey, proportionately more Arab Americans contribute to presidential candidates than any other ethnic group—and the groups surveyed included Asian Americans, Italian Americans, African Americans, Hispanic Americans, and Jewish Americans. Over the past decade especially, Arab-American political clout has increased. Although Arab Americans were long shunned by political candidates, President Clinton became the first sitting president to speak at conferences of Arab-American organizations, and both President Clinton and President Bush have normalized ongoing consultations with Arab- and Muslim-American leaders. In the fall 2000 elec-

in a *New York Times* article appearing a week after the horror that befell America on September 11, a Muslim woman described her dilemma this way: "I am so used to thinking about myself as a New Yorker that it took me a few days to begin to see myself as a stranger might: a Muslim woman, an outsider, perhaps an enemy of the city. Before last week, I had thought of myself as a lawyer, a feminist, a wife, a sister, a friend, a woman on the street. Now I begin to see myself as a brown woman who bears a vague resemblance to the images of terrorists we see on television and in the newspapers. I can only imagine how much more difficult it is for men who look like Mohamed Atta or Osama bin Laden."

Excruciating moments like those the nation experienced last September test the identity of all Americans, but especially those whose identity may be caught in the middle. Many Arab and Muslim Americans lost loved ones and friends in the attacks in New York and Washington, and others had loved ones

dispatched to Afghanistan as American soldiers to punish those who perpetrated the horror (Muslims are the largest minority religion in the U.S. armed forces). But many also had double fears for their own children. On the one hand, they shared the fears of all Americans about the new risks of ter-

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tion, presidential candidates sought the support of Arab Americans, not only for campaign contributions, but also as swing voters in key states, especially Michigan. The September 11 tragedy, coming just as Arab-American political clout was ascendant, has provided a real test for the community's role in American society and politics.

Impact of September 11

For Arab and Muslim leaders, the terrorist crisis has been like no other. It has forced them to contemplate profoundly their identity. Are they Arabs and Muslims living in America, or are they Americans with Arab and Muslim background? The answer came within hours after the terrorist attacks. Major Arab and Muslim organizations issued statements strongly condemning the attacks, refusing to allow their typical frustrations with issues of American policy in the Middle East to become linked to their rejection of the terror. Rarely have Arab and Muslim organizations in the United States been so assertive.

The enormity of the horror, the Middle Eastern background of the terrorists, and the terrorists' attempt to use religion to justify their acts have inevitably led to episodes of discrimination against Arabs and Muslims, as well as against those, such as Sikhs, who resemble them. But the support that both Arabs and Muslims received from thousands of people and organizations far outweighed the negative reaction. Arab and Muslim organizations were flooded with letters and calls of empathy from leaders and ordinary Americans, including many Jewish Americans, for most understood that at stake were the civil liberties of all Americans.

In large part, the public reaction was a product of quick decisions and statements by President Bush and members of his cabinet, members of Congress from both parties, and local political leaders. The president in particular acted quickly to make two central points that seem to have resonated with most of the public. The first was that the terrorists did not represent Islam and that Osama bin Laden must not be allowed to turn his terror into a conflict between Islam

and the West. The second was that Muslim and Arab Americans are loyal Americans whose rights must be respected. Bush's early appearance at a Washington, D.C., mosque with Muslim-American leaders underlined the message.

The message seems to have gotten through. Despite the fears that many Americans now associate with people of Middle-Eastern background, a survey conducted in late October by Zogby International found that most Americans view the Muslim religion positively and that the vast majority of Arabs and Muslims approve the president's handling of the crisis. (Among Arab Americans, 83 percent give President Bush a positive performance rating.) Moreover, 69 percent of Arab Americans support "an all-out war against countries which harbor or aid terrorists."

Certainly, the events of September 11 will intensify the debate within the Arab and Muslim communities in America about who they are and what their priorities should be. One thing is already clear. Although both communities have asserted their American identity as never before and although 65 percent of Arab Americans feel embarrassed because the attacks were apparently committed by people from Arab countries, their pride in their heritage has not diminished. The October survey found that 88 percent of Arab Americans are extremely proud of their heritage. So far, however, the terrorist attacks have not affected the priorities of the Arab public in America as might be expected, given Arab Americans' deep fear of discrimination.

Typically, Arab-American organizations highlight such domestic issues as secret evidence and racial profiling and such foreign policy issues as Jerusalem, Iraq, and the Palestinian-Israeli conflict. While Arab Americans, like other minorities, are involved in all American issues and are divided as Democrats and Republicans, as groups they inevitably focus on issues about which they tend to agree. The situation is no different from that of American Jews, who are also diverse, but whose organizations largely focus on issues of common interest.

Given the fear of profiling that Arab Americans had even before September,

one would expect this issue to have become central for most of them since September 11. And for many it certainly has. Arab-American organizations, especially, have focused on it. But the findings of the Zogby poll among Arab Americans in October were surprising. Although 32 percent of Arab Americans reported having personally experienced discrimination in the past because of their ethnicity, and although 37 percent said they or their family members had experienced discrimination since September 11, 36 percent nevertheless supported profiling of Arab Americans, while 58 percent did not. Surprisingly, 54 percent of Arab Americans believed that law enforcement officials are justified in engaging in extra questioning and inspections of people with Middle Eastern accents or features.

Though their views on profiling have been mixed since September 11, Arab Americans have been considerably more unanimous on one subject—the need to resolve the Palestinian-Israeli dispute. Seventy-eight percent of those surveyed agreed that "a U.S. commitment to settle the Israeli-Palestinian dispute would help the president's efforts in the war against terrorism." Although most Arab Americans are Christian and mostly from Lebanon and Syria—and only a minority are Palestinians—their collective consciousness has been affected by the Palestinian issue in the same way that Arab consciousness in the Middle East has been affected. In a survey I commissioned in five Arab states (Lebanon, Syria, United Arab Emirates, Saudi Arabia, and Egypt) last spring, majorities in each country consistently ranked the Palestinian issue as "the single most important issue to them personally." The role of this issue in the collective consciousness of many Arabs and Muslims worldwide is akin to the role that Israel has come to play in contemporary Jewish identity.

Like all Americans since September 11, Arab and Muslim Americans are searching for solutions to terrorism. Like all Americans, they are also finding new meaning in aspects of their identity to which they might have given little thought a few short months ago. ■

From Melting Pot to Centrifuge

Immigrants and American

By Steven E. Schier

In a typical day in the 1890s, thousands of immigrants arrived at Ellis Island in New York. For many, learning English and acculturating to America would be the work of years, even decades. But often it would be a matter of only a few weeks or even days before they received a visit from a Tammany Hall ward heeler or before friends or family brought them along to some event at the local precinct hall. Long before many of those newcomers fully understood what it was to be American, they knew quite well what it meant to be a Democrat or a Republican.

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Today—just as it was a hundred years ago—the foreign-born share of the American population is at a peak. The recent wave of immigration differs both demographically and politically from that of a century ago, of course. Today's immigrants originate in Latin America and Asia, not in southern, central, and eastern Europe. But how quickly and how well immigrant newcomers are absorbed into American society may depend less on where they come from than on what they find when they get here. Once at the center of U.S. politics from the moment they arrived, immigrants are now much closer to the fringes. That is no accident. The centripetal forces drawing immigrants into electoral politics in 1900 have been succeeded by a set of strong and persistent centrifugal forces that discourage the full electoral participation and political assimilation that earlier generations of immigrants enjoyed.

Nineteenth-century immigrants arrived to find important political groups eager to satisfy their material needs. Political parties, especially the many urban political machines, needed immigrants' votes and did their best to get them—accelerating the newcomers' political assimilation in the process. Today, the American political system, less in need of new immigrants' votes, does little to bring them into the world of campaigns and elections. Three big changes in American politics—the diminishing role of the parties, the rise of a new kind of campaigning, and (ironically) efforts to get more minorities into government—have left immigrants on the outside looking in.

A Golden Age of Party Politics

At the end of the 19th century, American politics was emphatically organized around party politics. In the late 1800s, parties dominated all aspects of electoral life, including candidate nominations, campaign strategies and tactics, voting, and the allegiances of voters. Voting in the 1880s meant casting a public, party-line ballot at the polls. Candidates were nominated in private party meetings—the proverbial “smoke-filled rooms”—and most voters happily cast a straight ticket for one party or the other.

Immigrants entered politics through the enthusiastic embrace of political parties. The two major parties, highly competitive in national politics, often desperately needed new voters, whom they mobilized through a series of inclusive tactics. The primary means of contact was person-to-person, and voter turnouts were astoundingly high by today's standards—more than 80 percent in presidential elections and 70 percent in off-year congressional elections.

All this made the arrival of immigrants a welcome event for urban party organizations. Parties moved immigrants into active citizenship by facilitating their naturalization, identifying and promoting leaders from immigrant communities, creating a cultural bridge to politics for the newcomers, and providing career ladders for advancement within party organizations.

The result was a remarkable record of political assimilation, described by Henry Jones Ford in 1911: “The nationalizing influence continues to produce results of the greatest social value, for in coordinating the various elements of the population for political purposes, party organization at the same time tends to fuse them into one mass of citizenship, pervaded by a common order of ideas and sentiments.... This is probably the secret of the powerful solvent influence which American civilization exerts upon the enormous deposits of alien population thrown upon this country by the torrent of emigration.”

Today, parties undertake remarkably few of the functions they performed for immigrants 100 years ago. A spate of Progressive reforms, brought about in response to the all-too-frequent corruption of elections by parties, set in motion a long decline in party power that persists to this day. Primaries, not caucuses, now decide party nominations. Patronage government employment gave way to civil service reforms. The ballot is now secret, and voters can split their ticket between the parties. Personal registration requirements were enacted to discourage vote fraud. Many states adopted initiative and referendum systems to allow direct public votes on matters of policy, thus bypassing party-dominated and frequently corrupt state legislatures. The big winners in these reforms were the Progressives themselves, a socially and economically elite group of reformers. As political scientist Jerome Mileur explains: “In the end, what the Progressive political reforms achieved was not to make America a ‘true’ democracy...but to change the rules of the political game so that the Progressives and their conception of national purpose might triumph.”

Immigrants are, in some respects, the victims of these reforms. A complex and demanding voting system and more limited opportunities for government employment all distance the political system from immigrants. The decline of parties has also made politics much more difficult for newcomers to fathom. In place of two parties and straight-ticket voting—a simple choice for immigrants new to the language—our electoral politics now is beset with a plethora of players and a confusing clutter of messages.

Interest Groups and Narrowcasting

Since the 1960s, interest groups have taken up many of the functions of political parties in elections. Groups now help recruit candidates, give funds directly to candidates, run their own ads on behalf of candidates, and target their own supporters for get-out-the-vote efforts. Parties still deploy consider-

able funds in national elections, but usually through the contributions of groups and at times in collaboration with groups. Candidates are less dependent on “the party message” for victory, since they must conduct a personal campaign for support in primary elections and another self-directed campaign in the general election. It’s hard for voters to keep track of all the messages from candidates, parties, and groups in the weeks before the election. And immigrant citizens, with their limited exposure to our politics, are particularly likely to react to the clutter with confusion.

A shift in electoral strategy from mass mobilization to activating key blocs of likely voters has also disadvantaged immigrants. Decades ago, parties and politicians mounted campaigns to engage the partisan masses and spared no effort to bring them, by means subtle or otherwise, to the polls. Today elections feature “narrowcasting”—remarkably thorough efforts to find narrow but potentially decisive slivers of the adult population. Polling and focus groups reveal to campaigns who these “swing voters” are and what they want. Then targeted mailings, phone calls, personal visits, and television ads aim to turn these voters out for particular candidates. Immigrants, with relatively little political knowledge and limited records of political participation, seldom fit the profile of a swing voter; so most campaigns ignore them. Expending resources on citizens such as immigrants who are not likely to vote is a waste of scarce campaign funds.

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Making Elections Matter

The rise of noncompetitive electoral districts also discourages outreach to new voters. When immigration last peaked, at the end of the 19th century, most U.S. House and state legislative districts saw greater turnover among incumbents, as well as more competitive races. In the election of 2000, only about 35 of 435 House races were electorally competitive. Even the presidential election, the closest in American history, was closely fought in only a relatively few states. During the 1980s and 1990s, 90 percent of state legislators who were renominated won reelection.

Competition declined partly because of the increasing shrewdness with which incumbents pursue reelection, aided at every level by the new campaign tools. But another reason for the decline, particularly in the House, was the 1983 amendment of the Voting Rights Act of 1965 to mandate the creation of “majority minority” districts. To remedy the chronic underrepresentation of African Americans and Latinos in the House, districts were redrawn to ensure that the share of racial minority House members of each state’s delegation approximated the share of minorities in each state’s population—in other words, outcomes had to be demographically correct. Though subject to frequent federal court challenge and Supreme Court reinterpretation, the law persists to this day. Implementing it has indeed created more black and Latino House members, but has also packed black

and Latino voters into districts that are noncompetitive and overwhelmingly Democratic. High turnouts among immigrants are thus less vital to electoral victory, slowing in particular the entry of immigrant Latinos into the American electoral system.

The parties' emphasis on "Americanizing" immigrants has also been turned on its head by the rise of identity politics. In this view, as Michael Barone puts it, "America would be made up of separate and disparate 'multicultural' groups, fenced off in their own communities, entitled to make demands on the larger society but without any responsibility to assimilate American mores." In place of two dominant parties encouraging political assimilation, many immigrants now encounter political appeals from interest groups, some with a separatist, multicultural agenda.

Party appeals today focus less on material benefits than on ideological abstractions. Our two major parties are no longer led by practical politicians eager to exchange jobs or services for immigrants' votes, but rather by ideological activists of the left and right whose agenda and oratory have little resonance in immigrant communities. The very language of politics itself is now so replete with ideological jargon that most immigrants cannot follow it. Political scientist Russell Neuman found that only about one-fifth of Americans can reliably define the terms "liberal" and "conservative," the coin of the realm in our ideologically polarized politics. As Neuman explains, "the generally held belief among elites that the public understands political abstractions is an optical illusion, generated by the fact that the elite stratum is consumed in a political conversation with itself and only rarely has occasion to discuss politics with the apolitical mass citizenry." Political abstractions provide ideological benefits to the politically sophisticated, but they engage immigrant political neophytes far less, if at all.

The result, predictably, is that few immigrants vote. This is strikingly the case with the largest group of American immigrants—Latinos. In the 2000 election Latinos made up 10 percent of the adult population but only 4 percent of the electorate. Latinos will remain an underrepresented minority in politics until our political system draws in immigrants again.

Finding Their Voice

Can that happen? Although restoring the political parties to their 19th-century preeminence might have some advantages, the partisan era is gone, and few seem anxious to revive it. Parties will remain just one of several players in a highly complex system of elections. Still, much can be done to make the electoral system more inclusive—and doing so will benefit all Americans, not just immigrants. America's electoral turnout today is among the world's lowest. Presidential contests—even the 2000 cliffhanger—draw barely half the eligible adult population, and off-year elections pull in just over one-third. Other nations do much better, and we can learn from their success.

The central problem is that our electoral system provides precious little incentive to include citizens who traditionally don't vote or who, as immigrants, have not yet developed the voting habit. The contemporary art of electoral activation allows candidates, parties, and interest groups to target reliably that small group of undecided likely voters for maximum attention, while ignoring traditional nonvoters.

To counter this syndrome, two goals must guide reform. First, we need to provide incentives for parties, interests, and candidates to seek out every possible voter. One reform has great promise. Automatic national voter registration would increase the pool of eligible voters, broaden electioneering, and raise turnout.


Second, to encourage more citizens to vote, we must make voting shorter, simpler, and more decisive, much as party voting was at the end of the 19th century. Today voting is a lengthy, complex task that seldom yields decisive results for the future direction of government. When I went to the polls in Northfield, Minnesota, in November 2000, I was confronted with a ballot requiring me to cast 26 votes—on everything from the presidency to whether to retain local judges, select county soil and water commissioners, and determine the fate of local tax levies. I resolved to vote only on matters about which I knew enough to make a reliable choice. I ended up casting 9 of 26 possible votes.

If a professor of political science can't make sense of even half of his ballot choices, how are immigrants, new to the electoral system, to find their visit to the polls anything other than an exercise in frustration? The first reform is to simplify the ballot. States should eliminate—or at the very least, curtail—initiatives and referenda. Twenty-six states allow them, the worst offenders in 2000 being Oregon with 18 and California with 12 statewide initiatives on their ballots. These Progressive reforms place an unmanageable burden on most voters and usurp powers properly exercised by state legislatures. States could also cease the direct election of their constitutional officers. If the president can appoint his own attorney general, why can't a governor?

States should consider returning to the party ballot, or at least to the party-column ballot that makes straight-ticket voting easier. A partisan vote is a rational method for addressing the myriad choices presented to voters and could prove particularly useful to neophytes. Party voting might also encourage more unified party government, in which one party has control of the executive and legislative branches. This unified control can make it easier for new voters to hold government accountable for its actions.

It's no wonder immigrants have trouble making sense of our elections. We need to make it easier for all Americans—even political science professors—to understand the choices presented to them at the polls. Immigrants won't find their proper voice in our democracy until we all do. ■

The decline
of parties
has also
made politics
much more
difficult for
newcomers
to fathom.



STEVE MCCRACKEN

If your friends and colleagues are like mine, they tend to orient their domestic travel plans around cherished ethnic restaurants. So do I. But many carry their enthusiasm a step further, seeing the extraordinary variety and quality of ethnic cuisine now available in the United States as evidence of the unalloyed benefits flowing from our racial and ethnic diversity. I call this syndrome “sushiology.”

SUSHIOLOGY

Does Diversity Work?

By Peter Skerry

Peter Skerry is a nonresident senior fellow in the Brookings Governmental Studies program and professor of government at Claremont McKenna College.

For a more nuanced view of the profound demographic changes sweeping the United States, talk to a priest in a typical Catholic parish in southern California. The priest might, like the rest of us, wax poetic about his favorite local ethnic restaurants. But he will also note the daunting problems of, say, putting on Sunday mass for parishioners who speak English, Spanish, Vietnamese, and Tagalog. Should there be a separate mass in each language? Or should masses be multilingual, with different parts in various languages? Whichever he chooses, someone will feel neglected. And in any case, he must find priests with the needed language skills.

Language is only the most obvious problem introduced by diversity. In a small town in Iowa large numbers of new Latino immigrants create resentment among long-time Anglo parishioners when they bring little children to church and let them roam about during services. Such resentments are typically attributed to Anglo "insensitivity" or "racism." But as the *Wall Street Journal* recently reported, intense animosities have flared between newly arrived Mexicans and more established Puerto Ricans and Dominicans in a predominantly Latino parish in the Bronx. No wonder the Hispanic Jesuit Alan Figueroa-Deck, writing in the liberal Catholic magazine *America*, criticizes the hierarchy's "ideology of multiculturalism" and points to the remarkable success of Evangelical and Pentecostal Protestants in building ethnically homogeneous congregations among Latinos. Clearly, diversity's beauty is in the eye of the beholder.

Does diversity work? And how well? Surprisingly, neither question gets much attention. The benefits and costs of diversity have yet to be adequately evaluated in light of specific problems or objectives. In this brief space I will move beyond the anecdotal evidence—beyond sushiology—and review some findings of social scientists who have systematically examined the consequences of racial and ethnic diversity. Not surprisingly, these findings conflict. But at the very least, they show the sushiologists' view to be wildly opti-

mistic. A more sober perspective is needed, one that remembers what political and social thinkers have long understood: that diversity is typically associated with dissent and conflict. Why is this downside of diversity so consistently overlooked?

Balancing Benefits and Costs

Let's look again at ethnic restaurants. What does it mean to patronize such establishments? Analytically, it means engaging in a market exchange relationship where the negative externalities sometimes associated with immigration are minimized, ignored, or reversed. For example, a language barrier, inconvenient in other contexts, is part of the ambience diners enjoy in a restaurant. And if they don't like the food, they can take their business elsewhere. They can also focus on those dishes that please their palates, such as chicken mole, and avoid those that do not, such as menudo, the pungent soup that Mexicans make from bovine entrails.

So visits to ethnic restaurants feature a high degree of consumer sovereignty. Indeed, the public accommodation provisions of the 1964 Civil Rights Act offer customers complete freedom of choice among eateries, while giving proprietors practically no choice about whom they may serve. Surely this is one reason why Americans enjoy ethnic restaurants so much and why diversity enthusiasts cite them so frequently. But the imbalance built into such relationships makes them atypical, a poor basis for generalizations about the costs and benefits of diversity.

What about diversity in other realms? Immigration, for instance? There the discussion, at least among social analysts, begins to take into account both costs and benefits. While sushiologists enthusiastically invoke diversity in their defense of currently high levels of immigration, economist George Borjas criticizes that same policy by noting that it lacks diversity. Pointing out that today's influx is much more ethnically homogeneous than that a century ago, Borjas argues that greater diversity in the national-origin mix of the current immigrant stream is needed to retard the

development of isolated ethnic enclaves. He concludes: "Ironically, 'diversity pays' in a sense that is at complete odds with what is typically implied by those who favor multiculturalism."

Economist Edward Lazear advances a different rationale for diversity. He suggests that a more ethnically varied immigrant stream would make Americans more productive by introducing new modes of thinking and more efficient ways of delivering goods and services. In a related vein, political scientist James Scott makes a case for social diversity: "Like the diverse old-growth forest, a richly differentiated neighborhood with many kinds of shops, entertainment centers, services, housing options, and public spaces is, virtually by definition, a more resilient and durable neighborhood. Economically, the diversity of its commercial 'bets' (everything from funeral parlors and public services to grocery stores and bars) makes it less vulnerable to economic downturns. At the same time its diversity provides many opportunities for economic growth in upturns."

As Scott acknowledges, he draws heavily on the work of urban analyst Jane Jacobs. And while neither Scott nor Jacobs is concerned specifically with race or ethnicity, this dimension of social diversity is clearly implicit in their analyses. More to the point, neither Scott nor Jacobs focuses narrowly on the economic benefits of diversity. Both argue that diversity sustains the informal relations on which the formal institutions of modern societies critically depend for social order.

Yet Jacobs's insight can lead to quite different conclusions. Her work has been relied on by social scientists developing innovative approaches to law enforcement, such as community policing. And here, diversity appears less rosy. Writes Wesley Skogan: "Equitable Community Policing efforts may only be possible when there is a degree of homogeneity and consensus that does not exist in many troubled neighborhoods.... One of the greatest problems is that it is difficult to organize low-income, heterogeneous, deteriorating, high-turnover, disorderly neighbor-

hoods. For community organizers, the American context of diversity is a fundamental part of the problems they face.”

This skepticism is echoed by criminologists Jerome Skolnick and David Bayley, who observe: “Police-community reciprocity can be achieved only where there is a genuine bonding of interests between the police and the served citizenry, on the one hand, and among definable sections of the public, on the other. That may turn out to be progressively difficult to accomplish in demographically complex urban areas, with their increasingly ethnic diversity.”

Other analysts note the deleterious impact of racial and ethnic diversity on working-class cohesion and social democratic movements. Comments political scientist Gary Freeman: “Weak labor movements are generally found in those countries that are ethnically heterogeneous. The most notable example is, of course, the United States, where racial divisions have historically vitiated the efforts of the labor movement to push for social reform. By making racially diverse societies out of previously homogeneous ones, migration has complicated social and political cleavages.”

Equally suggestive is the body of research produced by social psychologists and organizational behavioralists, some drawing on small-group research in laboratory settings, others on field analysis of natural settings. Strikingly, few of these studies focus on racial and ethnic diversity—as opposed to age, gender, or occupational diversity. One possible explanation was un-



Racial and ethnic diversity can generate more creative and innovative ideas, but it is also linked with conflict.

expectedly highlighted in a survey of more than 500 employees at the international headquarters of a major household goods moving firm. Survey researchers were permitted to collect data on a variety of employee characteristics—but not on ethnic background and nationality.

Diversity Brings Conflict

A consistent finding of research is that racial and ethnic diversity can generate more creative and innovative ideas—but that it is also linked with conflict, especially emotional conflict among co-workers. In a nutshell, diversity appears to produce both positive outcomes and obstacles to implementing those outcomes. To be sure, racial and ethnic diversity is not the only source of conflict in such settings. Age similarity, for instance, can foster intense competition among peer rivals, which can undermine organizational cohesion. Nevertheless, racial and ethnic diversity appears to be a salient source of dissension and conflict.

Not surprisingly, the proportions of racial and ethnic minorities affect these outcomes in complicated ways. The effect of a single minority individual on group dynamics, whether social interactions or task performance, will differ from that of several. Then, too, not all sources of racial and ethnic diversity are equivalent. There is evidence that Asians and whites work together better than blacks and whites. There is also evidence that culturally diverse groups perform better on lengthy and complex tasks than on simpler, quick-turn-around assignments.

Explanations of these dynamics vary. Again, the most obvious and mundane is language. In the dry formulation of one study of multinational military forces: “Cultural heterogeneity may contribute to the emergence of coordination and communication problems.” More sophisticated explanations rely on “social categorization theory,” which posits the familiar tendency of individuals to be drawn to those like themselves and to create in-groups and out-groups. It is precisely this dynamic that results in racial and ethnic conflict within organizations. Yet social categorization theory also suggests the possibility of creating broadly inclusive common identities and goals that would subsume racial and ethnic identities and moderate such conflicts.

Thus, while most researchers find an association between racial and ethnic diversity and conflict, they also hold out hope that the conflict can be managed and even overcome—in other words, that the benefits of diversity can be made to outweigh the costs. At the end of their careful review of 40 years of research on diversity (including racial and ethnic) in organizations, psychologists Katherine Williams and Charles O'Reilly conclude: “The preponderance of empirical evidence suggests that diversity is most likely to impede group functioning. Unless steps are taken to actively counteract these effects...by itself, diversity is more likely to have negative than positive effects on group performance.... In our view, these conclusions suggest that diversity is a mixed blessing and requires careful and sustained attention to be a positive force in enhancing performance.”

Downplaying the Tensions

Needless to say, getting to where the benefits of racial and ethnic diversity outweigh the costs can be a tall order. Precisely because diversity is a mixed blessing, it is difficult to muster the careful and sustained attention needed to make it work—especially in a highly individualistic and competitive society, where the organizational or governmental capacity to sustain such focus is always in short supply. Not surprisingly,

advocates, especially those concerned with “diversity management,” tend to downplay or even deny the fundamental tensions and conflicts engendered by diversity.

A case in point is University of Michigan psychologist Patricia Gurin, whose research on diversity in higher education was submitted as part of a recent, widely publicized federal suit over Michigan’s affirmative action undergraduate admission program. (As of this writing, the policy remains in place, pending final determination by a federal appeals court.) Without engaging either the methodological disputes surrounding Gurin’s research or the substantive disagreements over her support for affirmative action, I would suggest that Gurin’s work exemplifies the pervasive but little noted tendency to downplay the costs of diversity.

Gurin’s argument in favor of racial and ethnic diversity on campus draws on the work of Erik Erikson, Jean Piaget, and other developmental psychologists, who hold that the emotional and intellectual development of young adults depends critically on being confronted by discontinuities and discrepancies with their own family backgrounds. While Gurin acknowledges that Erikson was not making an explicit case for social diversity, she strenuously maintains that his arguments “provide a strong theoretical rationale for the importance of bringing students from varied backgrounds together to create a diverse and complex learning environment.”

Such insights have become conventional wisdom, especially among the middle and upper-middle classes. No sur-



Perhaps our tolerance for diversity needs to be counterbalanced by tolerance for the conflict that typically follows.

prises here. What is noteworthy about Gurin’s analysis is her effort to secure the benefits of racial and ethnic diversity without incurring the costs. To be sure, she explicitly bases her theoretical perspective on the assumption that diversity leads to conflict and that “it is discourse over conflict, not unanimity, that helps democracy thrive,” buttressing the point with references to Aristotle.

Yet when Gurin moves beyond theory to address the specific implications of diversity at universities, her celebration of diversity-induced conflict gets downplayed, even disappears. She writes: “Institutions with diverse student bodies must be attentive to creating conditions that diminish competition among groups and value the diversity that students bring to the classroom as an important part of making the most of learning that can occur in diverse classrooms.” Gurin goes on to gently chide race relations researcher Hubert Blalock for not addressing how to diminish racial conflict: “Blalock theorizes that as the number of minority individuals increases, the greater the likelihood that there will be conflict and competition with members of the majority. He does not theorize, however, how conflict can be minimized under conditions where increased diversity is inevitable. Educational institutions have the potential to minimize conflict.”

Cultivating a Taste for Conflict

Gurin is hardly alone in trying to have it both ways. Many of us avoid facing up to the full implications of diversity. Historian John

Higham traces this aversion to the romanticism that underlies contemporary pluralism. Today’s celebration of diversity, he notes, began more than a century ago with writers like William James, who “depended on an unstated assumption that a natural harmony underlies the conflicts and discords of life.... In an essentially friendly universe the parts can be true to their separate characters. Purposes can clash without rending.”

So, when diversity leads, as it usually does, to competition and conflict, we explain them away as the result either of irrational prejudice or of politics. The latter explanation is especially tempting, given our Lockean bent for limited government. Moreover, because of our tragic and violent racial history, in which the competition was so unfairly rigged against African Americans and other minorities, we are uneasy with intergroup conflict and prone to high-minded moralism—which seemingly permits us to transcend both racial discord and political strife. Then, too, as British philosopher Stuart Hampshire suggests, our aversion to conflict may also be traced to our Enlightenment faith in the power of reason to resolve fundamental human problems.

But as Hampshire and his fellow Briton, Bernard Crick, both emphasize (from very different perspectives), the purpose of politics is to cope with the conflicts that inevitably arise from the diverse interests that comprise any society. Hampshire makes the point with blunt eloquence: “Justice is conflict.” Perhaps, then, our tolerance for diversity needs to be counterbalanced by tolerance for the conflict that typically follows.

In a polyglot country such as ours, it may be tempting to exalt diversity—but not to the point of overlooking the real challenges and costs that it entails. Diversity can work, but making it work is a messy, contentious business. Reveling in the joys of ethnic cuisine is definitely inadequate to the task at hand. We need to recognize that diversity is no free lunch.

In the meantime, please pass the kung pao chicken. ■

Affirmative




By Peter H. Schuck

Affirmative action policy—by which I mean ethno-racial preferences in the allocation of socially valuable resources—is even more divisive and unsettled today than at its inception more than 30 years ago.

*Peter H. Schuck is professor of law at Yale University and New York University. This article is drawn from a chapter in a forthcoming book, *Diversity in America: Keeping Government at a Safe Distance* (Harvard).*

Affirmative action's policy context has changed dramatically since 1970. One change is legal. Since the Supreme Court's 1978 *Bakke* decision, when Justice Lewis Powell's pivotal fifth vote endorsed certain "diversity"-based preferences in higher education, the Court has made it increasingly difficult for affirmative action plans to pass constitutional muster unless they are carefully designed to remedy specific past acts of discrimination. Four other changes—the triumph of the nondiscrimination principle; blacks' large social gains; evidence on the size, beneficiaries, and consequences of preferences; and new demographic realities—persuade me that affirmative action as we know it should be abandoned even if it is held to be constitutional.

"As we know it" is the essential qualifier in that sentence. I propose neither a wholesale ban on affirmative action ("ending" it) nor tweaks in its administration ("mending" it). Rather, I would make two structural changes to curtail existing preferences while strengthening the remaining ones' claim to justice. First, affirmative action would be banned in the public sector but allowed in the private sector. Second, private-sector institutions that use preferences would be required to disclose how and why they do so. These reforms would allow the use of preferences by private institutions that believe in them enough to disclose and defend them, while doing away with the obfuscation, duplicity, and lack of accountability that too often accompany preferences. Affirmative action could thus be localized and customized to suit the varying requirements of particular contexts and sponsors.



Action

Don't Mend It or End It—Bend It

tion,” he notes, “Afro-Americans dominate the nation’s popular culture.... [A]t least 35 percent of Afro-American adult, male workers are solidly middle class.” The income of young, intact black families approaches that of demographically similar whites. On almost every other social index (residential integration is a laggard), the black-white gap is narrowing significantly; indeed, the income gap for young black women has disappeared.

Even these comparisons understate black progress. Much of racism’s cruel legacy is permanently impounded in the low education and income levels of older blacks who grew up under Jim Crow; their economic disadvantages pull down the averages, obscuring the gains of their far better-educated children and grandchildren. These gains, moreover, have coincided with the arrival of record numbers of immigrants who are competing with blacks. To ignore this factor, economist Robert Lerner says, is like analyzing inequality trends in Germany since 1990 without noting that it had absorbed an entire impoverished country, East Germany. In addition, comparisons that fail to age-adjust social statistics obscure the fact that blacks, whose average age is much lower than that of whites, are less likely to have reached their peak earning years.

My point, emphatically, is not that blacks have achieved social equality—far from it—but that the situation facing them today is altogether different than it was when affirmative action was adopted. Advocates, of course, say that this progress just proves that affirmative action is effective; hence it should be continued or even increased. But this *post hoc ergo propter hoc* reasoning is fallacious and ignores the policy’s growing incoherence and injustice.

Size, Beneficiaries, and Consequences of Preferences

When we weigh competing claims for scarce resources—jobs, admission to higher education, public and private contracts, broadcast or other spectrum licenses, credit, housing, and the like—how heavy is the thumb that affirmative action places on the scales? This is a crucial question. The larger the preference, the more it conflicts with competing interests and values, especially the ideal of merit—almost regardless of how one defines merit.

The best data concern higher education admissions where (for better or for worse) schools commonly use standardized test scores as a proxy for aptitude, preparation, and achievement. William Bowen and Derek Bok, the former presidents of Princeton and Harvard, published a study in 1999 based largely

Triumph of the Nondiscrimination Principle

Why is change necessary? To explain, one must at the outset distinguish affirmative action entailing preferences from nondiscrimination, a principle that simply requires one to refrain from treating people differently because of their race, ethnicity, or other protected characteristics. Although this distinction can blur at the edges, it is clear and vital both in politics and in principle.

When affirmative action became federal policy in the late 1960s, the nondiscrimination principle, though fragile, was gaining strength. Preferences, by contrast, were flatly rejected by civil rights leaders like Hubert Humphrey, Ted Kennedy, and Martin Luther King, Jr. In the three decades that followed, more and more Americans came to embrace nondiscrimination and to oppose affirmative action, yet as John Skrentny shows in his *Ironies of Affirmative Action*, federal bureaucrats extended affirmative action with little public notice or debate. Today, nondiscrimination, or equal opportunity, is a principle questioned by only a few bigots and extreme libertarians, and civil rights law is far-reaching and remedially robust. In contrast, affirmative action is widely seen as a demand for favoritism or even equal outcomes.

Social Gains by Blacks

Blacks, the intended beneficiaries of affirmative action, are no longer the insular minority they were in the 1960s. Harvard sociologist Orlando Patterson shows their “astonishing” progress on almost every front. “A mere 13% of the popula-

STEVE McCracken

on the academic records of more than 80,000 students who entered 28 highly selective institutions in three different years. Affirmative action, they claimed, only applies to these institutions, although a more recent study suggests that the practice now extends to some second- and even third-tier schools.

Selective institutions, of course, take other factors into account besides race. Indeed, some whites who are admitted have worse academic credentials than the blacks admitted under preferences. Still, Bowen and Bok find a difference of almost 200 points in the average SAT scores of the black and white applicants, and even this understates the group difference. First, the deficit for black applicants' high school grade point average (GPA), the other main admission criterion, is even larger. Thomas Kane finds that black applicants to selective schools "enjoy an advantage equivalent to an increase of two-thirds of a point in [GPA]—on a four-point scale—or [the equivalent of] 400 points on the SAT." Second, although the SAT is often criticized as culturally biased against blacks, SAT (and GPA) scores at every level actually overpredict their college performance. Third, the odds were approximately even that black applicants with scores between 1100 and 1199 would be admitted, whereas the odds for whites did not reach that level until they had scores in the 1450–1499 range. With a score of 1500 or above, more than a third of whites were rejected while every single black gained admission. The University of Michigan, whose affirmative action program is detailed in a pending lawsuit, weighs race even more heavily than the average school in the Bowen and Bok sample. At Michigan, being black, Hispanic, or Native American gives one the equivalent of a full point of GPA; minority status can override any SAT score deficit. And a recent study of 47 public institutions found that the odds of a black student being admitted compared to a white student with the same SAT and GPA were 173 to 1 at Michigan and 177 to 1 at North Carolina State.

These preferences, then, are not merely tie-breakers; they are huge—and they continue at the graduate and professional school levels. It is encouraging that an identical share (56 percent) of black and white graduates of the institutions in the Bowen and Bok sample earned graduate degrees; the share of blacks earning professional or doctoral degrees was actually slightly higher than for whites (40 percent vs. 37 percent). But black students' college grades and postgraduate test scores are so much lower on average that their admission to these programs, disproportionately at top-tier institutions, also depends on affirmative action. In the early 1990s, for example, only a few dozen of the 420 blacks admitted to the 18 most selective law schools would have been admitted absent affirmative action. A high percentage of these schools' black graduates eventually pass the bar examination, but some 22 percent of blacks from these schools who take the exam never pass it (compared with 3 percent of whites), and only 61 percent of blacks pass it the first time compared with 92 percent of whites. Blacks who enter the professions do enjoy solid status, income, civic participation and leadership, and career satisfaction. But this hardly makes the case for affirmative action, for

the higher-scoring applicants whom they displaced would presumably have done at least as well.

How much of blacks' impressive gains is due to reduced discrimination resulting from changing white attitudes and civil rights enforcement, as distinct from preferences? How would they have fared had they attended the somewhat less prestigious schools they could have attended without preferences? What would the demographics of higher education be without those preferences? We cannot answer these vital questions conclusively. We know that black gains were substantial even before preferences were adopted, that preference beneficiaries are overwhelmingly from middle- and upper-class families, and that most black leaders in all walks of life did not go to elite universities. We also know that many institutions are so committed to affirmative action that they will find ways to prefer favored groups—minorities, legacies, athletes, and others—no matter what the formal rules say. Although California voters banned affirmative action in state programs, their politicians press the university system to jigger the admission criteria until it finds a formula that can skirt the ban and produce the "correct" number of the favored minorities (excluding Asians, who are thought not to need the help).

New Demographic Realities

The moral case for affirmative action rests on the bitter legacy of black slavery, Jim Crow, and the violent dispossession of Native Americans. Yet the descendants of slaves and Native Americans constitute a shrinking share of affirmative action's beneficiaries. Political logrolling has extended preferential treatment to the largest immigrant group, Hispanics, as well as to blacks from Africa, the Caribbean, and elsewhere, Asians and Pacific Islanders, and in some programs to women, a majority group.

Some affirmative action advocates acknowledge this problem and want to fix it. Orlando Patterson, for example, would exclude "first-generation persons of African ancestry" but not "their children and later generations...in light of the persistence of racist discrimination in America." He would also exclude all Hispanics except for Puerto Ricans and Mexican Americans of second or later generations and would exclude "all Asians except Chinese-Americans descended from pre-1923 immigrants..." With due respect for Patterson's path-breaking work on race, his formula resembles a tax code provision governing depreciation expenses more than a workable formula for promoting social justice.

Centuries of immigration and intermarriage have rendered the conventional racial categories ever more meaningless. The number of Americans who consider themselves multiracial and who wish to be identified as such (if they must be racially identified at all) was 7 million in the 2000 census, including nearly 2 million blacks (5 percent of the black population) and 37 percent of all Native Americans. This is why advocacy groups who are desperate to retain the demographic status quo lobbied furiously to preempt a multiracial category.

In perhaps the most grimly ironic aspect of the new demographic dispensation, the government adopted something like

the one-drop rule that helped enslave mulattos and self-identifying whites before Emancipation. Under OMB's rules, any response combining one minority race and the white race must be allocated to the minority race. This, although 25 percent of those in the United States who describe themselves as both black and white consider themselves white, as do almost half of Asian-white people and more than 80 percent of Indian-white people. The lesson is clear: making our social policy pivot on the standard racial categories is both illogical and politically unsustainable.

Alternatives

Even a remote possibility that eliminating affirmative action would resegregate our society deeply distresses almost all Americans. Nothing else can explain the persistence of a policy that, contrary to basic American values, distributes valuable social resources according to skin color and surname. But to say that we must choose between perpetuating affirmative action and eliminating it entirely is false. To be sure, most suggested reforms—using social class or economic disadvantage rather than race, choosing among minimally qualified students by lottery, and making preferences temporary—are impracticable or would make matters worse. Limiting affirmative action to the descendants of slaves and Native Americans would minimize some objections to the policy but, as Patterson's proposal suggests, would be tricky to implement and would still violate the nondiscrimination and merit principles.

Most Americans who favor affirmative action would probably concede that it fails to treat the underlying problem. Black applicants will continue to have worse academic credentials until they can attend better primary and secondary schools and receive the remediation they need. A root cause of their disadvantage is inferior schooling, and affirmative action is simply a poultice. We must often deal with symptoms rather than root causes because we do not know how to eliminate them, or consider it too costly to do so, or cannot muster the necessary political will. If we know which social or educational reforms can substantially improve low-income children's academic performance, then we should by all means adopt them. But this does not mean that we should preserve affirmative action until we can eliminate the root causes of inequality.

I propose instead that we treat governmental, legally mandated preferences differently than private, voluntary ones. While prohibiting the former (except in the narrow remedial context approved by the Supreme Court), I would permit the latter—but only under certain conditions discussed below. A liberal society committed to freedom and private autonomy has good reasons to maintain this difference; racial preferences imposed by law are pernicious in ways that private ones are not. To affirmative action advocates, it is a Catch-22 to bar the benign use of race now after having used it against minorities for centuries. But to most Americans (including many minorities), affirmative action is not benign. It is not Catch-22 to rec-

ognize what history teaches—that race is perhaps the worst imaginable category around which to organize political and social relations. The social changes I have described only reinforce this lesson. A public law that affirms our common values should renounce the distributive use of race, not perpetuate it.

There are other differences between public and private affirmative action. A private preference speaks for and binds only those who adopt it and only for as long as they retain it. It does not serve, as public law should, as a social ideal. As I explained in *The Limits of Law: Essays on Democratic Governance* (2000), legal rules tend to be cruder, more simplistic, slower to develop, and less contextualized than voluntary ones, which are tailored to more specific needs and situations. Legal rules reflect interest group politics or the vagaries of judicial decision; voluntary ones reflect the chooser's own assessment of private benefits and costs. Legal rules are more difficult to reform, abandon, or escape. Voluntary ones can assume more diverse forms than mandated ones, a diversity that facilitates social learning and problem solving.

Still, many who believe in nondiscrimination and merit and who conscientiously weigh the competing values still support affirmative action. If a private university chooses to sacrifice some level of academic performance to gain greater racial diversity and whatever educational or other values it thinks diversity will bring, I cannot say—nor should the law say—that its choice is impermissible. Because even private affirmative action violates the nondiscrimination principle, however, I would permit it only on two

conditions: transparency and protection of minorities. First, the preference—its criteria, weights, and reasons—must be fully disclosed. If it cannot withstand public criticism, it should be scrapped. The goal is to discipline preferences by forcing institutions to reveal their value choices. This will trigger market, reputational, and other informal mechanisms that make them bear more of the policy's costs rather than just shifting them surreptitiously to nonpreferred applicants, as they do now. Second, private affirmative action must not disadvantage a group to which the Constitution affords heightened protection. A preference favoring whites, for example, would violate this condition.

The Commitment to Legal Equality

For better *and* for worse, American culture remains highly individualistic in its values and premises, even at some sacrifice (where sacrifice is necessary) to its goal of substantive equality. The illiberal strands in our tangled history that enslaved, excluded, and subordinated individuals as members of racial groups should chasten our efforts to use race as a distributive criterion. Affirmative action in its current form, however well-intended, violates the distinctive, deeply engrained cultural and moral commitments to legal equality, private autonomy, and enhanced opportunity that have served Americans well—even though they have not yet served all of us equally well. ■

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Brain Circulation

By AnnaLee Saxenian

How High-Skill Immigration Makes

Silicon Valley's workforce is among the world's most ethnically diverse. Not only do Asian and Hispanic workers dominate the low-paying, blue-collar workforce, but foreign-born scientists and engineers are increasingly visible as entrepreneurs and senior management. More than a quarter of Silicon Valley's highly skilled workers are immigrants, including tens of thousands from lands as diverse as China, Taiwan, India, the United Kingdom, Iran, Vietnam, the Philippines, Canada, and Israel.

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Understandably, the rapid growth of the foreign-born workforce has evoked intense debates over U.S. immigration policy, both here and in the developing world. In the United States, discussions of the immigration of scientists and engineers have focused primarily on the extent to which foreign-born professionals displace native workers. The view from sending countries, by contrast, has been that the emigration of highly skilled personnel to the United States represents a big economic loss, a "brain drain."

Neither view is adequate in today's global economy. Far from simply replacing native workers, foreign-born engineers are starting new businesses and generating jobs and wealth at least as fast as their U.S. counterparts. And the dynamism of emerging regions in Asia and elsewhere now draws skilled immigrants homeward. Even when they choose not to return home, they are serving as middlemen linking businesses in the United States with those in distant regions.



Everyone Better Off

THEODORE ANDERSON/IMAGE BANK

In some parts of the world, the old dynamic of “brain drain” is giving way to one I call “brain circulation.” Most people instinctively assume that the movement of skill and talent must benefit one country at the expense of another. But thanks to brain circulation, high-skilled immigration increasingly benefits both sides. Economically speaking, it is blessed to give *and* to receive.

“New” Immigrant Entrepreneurs

Unlike traditional ethnic entrepreneurs who remain isolated in marginal, low-wage industries, Silicon Valley’s new foreign-born entrepreneurs are highly educated professionals in dynamic and technologically sophisticated industries. And they have been extremely successful. By the end of the 1990s, Chinese and Indian engineers were running 29 percent of Silicon Valley’s technology businesses. By 2000, these companies collectively accounted for more than \$19.5 billion in sales and 72,839 jobs. And the pace of immigrant entrepre-

neurship has accelerated dramatically in the past decade.

Not that Silicon Valley’s immigrants have abandoned their ethnic ties. Like their less-educated counterparts, Silicon Valley’s high-tech immigrants rely on ethnic strategies to enhance entrepreneurial opportunities. Seeing themselves as outsiders to the mainstream technology community, foreign-born engineers and scientists in Silicon Valley have created social and professional networks to mobilize the information, know-how, skill, and capital to start technology firms. Local ethnic professional associations like the Silicon Valley Chinese Engineers Association, The Indus Entrepreneur, and the Korean IT Forum provide contacts and resources for recently arrived immigrants.

Combining elements of traditional immigrant culture with distinctly high-tech practices, these organizations simultaneously create ethnic identities within the region and aid professional networking and information exchange. These are not traditional political or

lobbying groups—rather their focus is the professional and technical advancement of their members. Membership in Indian and Chinese professional associations has virtually no overlap, although the overlap within the separate communities—particularly the Chinese, with its many specialized associations—appears considerable. Yet ethnic distinctions also exist within the Chinese community. To an outsider, the Chinese American Semiconductor Professionals Association and the North American Chinese Semiconductor Association are redundant organizations. One, however, represents Taiwanese, the other Mainland, Chinese.

Whatever their ethnicity, all these associations tend to mix socializing—over Chinese banquets, Indian dinners, or family-centered social events—with support for professional and technical advancement. Each, either explicitly or informally, offers first-generation immigrants professional contacts and networks within the local technology community. They serve as recruitment channels and provide role models of successful immigrant entrepreneurs and managers. They sponsor regular speakers and conferences whose subjects range from specialized technical and market information to how to write a business plan or manage a business. Some Chinese associations give seminars on English communication, negotiation skills, and stress management.

Many of these groups have become important cross-generational forums. Older engineers and entrepreneurs in both the Chinese and the Indian communities now help finance and mentor younger co-ethnic entrepreneurs. Within these networks, “angel” investors often invest individually or jointly in promising new ventures. The Indus Entrepreneur, for example, aims to “foster entrepreneurship by providing mentorship and resources” within the South Asian technology community. Both the Asian American Manufacturers Association and the Monte Jade Science and Technology Association sponsor annual investment conferences to match investors (often from Asia as well as Silicon Valley) with Chinese entrepreneurs.

Although many Chinese and Indian immigrants socialize primarily within their ethnic networks, they routinely work with U.S. engineers and U.S.-run businesses. In fact, recognition is growing within these communities that although a start-up might be spawned with the support of the ethnic networks, it must become part of the mainstream to grow. The most successful immigrant entrepreneurs in Silicon Valley today appear to be those who have drawn on ethnic resources while simultaneously integrating into mainstream technology and business networks.

Transnational Entrepreneurship

Far beyond their role in Silicon Valley, the professional and social networks that link new immigrant entrepreneurs with each other have become global institutions that connect new immigrants with their counterparts at home. These new transnational communities provide the shared information, contacts, and trust that allow local producers to participate in an increasingly global economy.

Silicon Valley's Taiwanese engineers, for example, have built a vibrant two-way bridge connecting them with Taiwan's technology community. Their Indian counterparts have become key middlemen linking U.S. businesses to low-cost software expertise in India. These cross-Pacific networks give skilled immigrants a big edge over mainstream competitors who often lack the language skills, cultural know-how, and contacts to build business relationships in Asia. The long-distance networks are accelerating the globalization of labor markets and enhancing opportunities for entrepreneurship, investment, and trade both in the United States and in newly emerging regions in Asia.

Taiwanese immigrant Miin Wu, for example, arrived in the United States in the early 1970s to pursue graduate training in electrical engineering. After earning a doctorate from Stanford University in 1976, Wu saw little use for his new skills in economically backward Taiwan and chose to remain in the United States. He worked for more than a decade in senior positions at Silicon

Valley-based semiconductor companies including Siliconix and Intel. He also gained entrepreneurial experience as one of the founding members of VLSI Technology.

By the late 1980s, Taiwan's economy had improved dramatically, and Wu decided to return. In 1989 he started one of Taiwan's first semiconductor companies, Macronix Co., in the Hsinchu Science-based Industrial Park. Wu also became an active participant in Silicon Valley's Monte Jade Science and Technology Association, which was building business links between the technical communities in Silicon Valley and Taiwan.

Macronix went public on the Taiwan stock exchange in 1995 and in 1996 became the first Taiwanese company to list on Nasdaq. It is now the sixth biggest semiconductor maker in Taiwan, with more than \$300 million in sales and some 2,800 employees. Although most of its employees and its manufacturing facilities are in Taiwan, Macronix has an advanced design and engineering center in Silicon Valley, where Wu regularly recruits senior managers. A Macronix venture capital fund invests in promising start-ups in both Silicon Valley and Taiwan—not to raise money but to develop technologies related to their core business. In short, Miin Wu's activities bridge and benefit both the Taiwan and Silicon Valley economies.

A New Model of Globalization

As recently as the 1970s, only giant corporations had the resources and capabilities to grow internationally, and they did so primarily by establishing marketing offices or manufacturing plants overseas. Today, new transportation and communications technologies allow even the smallest firms to build partnerships with foreign producers to tap overseas expertise, cost-savings, and markets. Start-ups in Silicon Valley are often global actors from the day they begin operations. Many raise capital from Asian sources, others subcontract manufacturing to Taiwan or rely on software development in India, and virtually all sell their products in Asian markets.

The scarce resource in this new environment is the ability to locate foreign partners quickly and to manage complex business relationships across cultural and linguistic boundaries. The challenge is keenest in high-tech industries whose products, markets, and technologies are continually being redefined—and whose product cycles are exceptionally short. For them, first-generation immigrants like the Chinese and Indian engineers of Silicon Valley, who have the language, cultural, and technical skills to thrive in both the United States and foreign markets, are invaluable. Their social structures enable even the smallest producers to locate and maintain collaborations across long distances and gain access to Asian capital, manufacturing capabilities, skills, and markets.

These ties have measurable economic benefits. For every 1 percent increase in the number of first-generation immigrants from a given country, for example, California's exports to that country go up nearly 0.5 percent. The effect is especially pronounced in the Asia-Pacific where, all other things being equal, California exports nearly four times more than it exports to comparable countries elsewhere in the world.

Growing links between the high-tech communities of Silicon Valley and Taiwan, for example, offer big benefits to both economies. Silicon Valley remains the center of new product definition and of design and development of leading-edge technologies, whereas Taiwan offers world-class manufacturing, flexible development and integration, and access to key customers and markets in China and Southeast Asia. But what appears a classic case of the economic benefits of comparative advantage would not be possible without the underlying social structures, provided by Taiwanese engineers, which ensure continuous flows of information between the two regions.

The reciprocal and decentralized nature of these relationships is distinctive. The ties between Japan and the United States during the 1980s were typically arm's-length, and technology transfers between large firms were man-

aged from the top down. The Silicon Valley–Hsinchu relationship, by contrast, consists of formal and informal collaborations among individual investors and entrepreneurs, small and medium-sized firms, and divisions of larger companies on both sides of the Pacific. In this complex mix, the rich social and professional ties among Taiwanese engineers and their U.S. counterparts are as important as the more formal corporate alliances and partnerships.

Silicon Valley–based firms are poised to exploit both India’s software talent and Taiwan’s manufacturing capabilities. Mahesh Veerina started Ramp Networks (initially Trancell Systems) in 1993 with several Indian friends, relatives, and colleagues. Their aim was to develop low-cost devices to speed Internet access for small businesses. By 1994, short on money, they decided to hire programmers in India for one-quarter of the Silicon Valley rate. One founder spent two years setting up and managing their software development center in the southern city of Hyderabad. By 1999 Ramp had 65 employees in Santa Clara and 25 in India.

Having used his Indian background to link California with India, Veerina then met two principals of a Taiwanese investment fund, InveStar, that folded in Taiwan. In less than three months, Veerina set up partnerships for high-volume manufacture of Ramp’s routers with three Taiwanese manufacturers (it took nine months to establish a similar partnership with a U.S. manufacturer). The Taiwanese price per unit was about half what Ramp was paying for manufacturing in the United States, and Ramp increased its output one-hundred-fold because of relationships subsequently built by Veerina with key customers in the Taiwanese personal computer industry. Ramp also opted to use the worldwide distribution channels of its Taiwanese partners. And when Ramp designed a new model, the Taiwanese manufacturer was prepared to ship product in two weeks—not the six months it would have taken in the United States.

Veerina attributes much of his success to InveStar’s partners and their net-

work of contacts in Taiwan. In a business where product cycles are often shorter than nine months, the speed and cost savings provided by these relationships provide critical competitive advantages to a firm like Ramp. InveStar sees as one of its key assets its intimate knowledge of the ins and outs of the business infrastructure in Taiwan’s decentralized industrial system. By helping outsiders (both Chinese and non-Chinese) negotiate these complicated networks to tap into Taiwan’s cost-effective and high-quality infrastructure and capability for speedy and flexible integration, such firms provide their clients far more than access to capital.

As Silicon Valley’s skilled Chinese and Indian immigrants create social and economic links to their home countries, they simultaneously open foreign markets and identify manufacturing options and technical skills in Asia for the broader U.S. business community. Traditional Fortune 500 corporations as well as newer technology companies, for example, now increasingly turn to India for software programming and development talent. Meanwhile, information technology–related sectors in the United States rely heavily on Taiwan (and more recently China) for their fast and flexible infrastructure for manufacturing semiconductors and PCs, as well as their growing markets for advanced technology components. And these distant resources are now just as accessible to new start-ups like Ramp as to more established corporations.

These new international linkages are strengthening the economic infrastructure of the United States while providing new opportunities for once peripheral regions of the world economy. Foreign-born engineers have started thousands of technology businesses in the United States, generating jobs, exports, and wealth at home and also accelerating the integration of these businesses into the global economy.

A New Policy Environment

The Silicon Valley experience underscores far-reaching transformations of the relationship between immigration, trade, and economic development in the 21st century. Where once the main economic ties between immigrants and their home countries were remittances sent to families left behind, today more and more skilled U.S. immigrants eventually return home. Those who remain in America often become part of transnational communities that link the United States to the economies of distant regions. These new immigrant entrepreneurs thus foster economic development directly, by creating new jobs and wealth, as well as indirectly, by coordinating the information flows and providing the linguistic and cultural know-how that promote trade and investment with their home countries.

Analysts and policy-makers must recognize this new reality. In the recent U.S. debate over making more H1-B visas available for highly skilled immigrants, discussion began—and ended—with the extent to which immigrants displace native workers. But these high-tech immigrants affect more than labor supply and wages. They also

create new jobs here and new ties abroad. Some of their economic contributions, such as enhanced trade and investment flows, are difficult to quantify, but they must figure into our debates.

Economic openness has its costs, to be sure, but the strength of the U.S. economy has historically derived from its openness and diversity—and this will be increasingly true as the economy becomes more global. As Silicon Valley’s new immigrant entrepreneurs suggest, Americans should resist viewing immigration and trade as zero-sum processes. We need to encourage the immigration of skilled workers—while simultaneously improving the education of workers here at home. ■

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Technology and Tolerant

Harvard University economist Edward Glaeser has provided ample empirical evidence that firms gather in particular regions to gain advantages from common labor pools. Nobel prize-winning economist Robert Lucas maintains that the driving force in the growth and development of cities and regions can be found in the productivity gains associated with the clustering of talented people.

But what brings talented workers to those areas? How do they make their residential decisions? What sets high-technology centers such as San Francisco, Boston, and New York apart from other metropolitan areas? Why have some cities—many home to some of the nation's most prestigious university research centers and college graduates—been unable to attract talented technology workers?


Our theory is that a city's diversity—its level of tolerance for a wide range of people—is key to its success in attracting talented people. Diverse, inclusive communities that welcome unconventional people—gays, immigrants, artists, and free-thinking “bohemians”—are ideal for nurturing the creativity and innovation that characterize the knowledge economy.

Testing the Theory

Using 1990 census numbers, we constructed four indices to capture the level of diversity and tolerance within the nation's 50 most populous metropolitan areas. Our first two indices—the gay index and the bohemian index—measure the representation of, respectively, gay male couples and bohemians (artists, musicians, writers, actors, directors,

When it comes to locating their plants and offices, businesses have always had a good eye for what matters most to their success. But the rules of the economic-development game have changed. In the past, companies built plants near raw materials or good transportation or in areas where costs were low. Today, however, when businesses make location decisions, they are on the lookout not for iron ore or forests, rivers or highways, but for people with ideas. The key to success in the knowledge-based economy is what economists call high human capital—what most of us would call talent.

Richard Florida is Heinz Professor of Regional Economic Development and co-director of the Software Industry Center at Carnegie Mellon University. Gary Gates is a research associate at the Urban Institute. This article is drawn from a longer paper originally written for the Brookings Center on Urban and Metropolitan Policy.



pace Diversity and High- Tech Growth

By Richard Florida and Gary Gates

The Nation's Capital Reveals the Nation's Future

The World in a Zip Code

By Audrey Singer, Samantha Friedman, Ivan Cheung, and Marie Price

s the politicians and policymakers of Washington, D.C., cope with a rapidly diversifying society, they may sometimes wonder how a truly globalized American metropolis will look. One way they can find out is to go outside and look around.

Between 1990 and 1998 nearly a quarter of a million legal immigrants arrived in Washington. In 1998 only four cities—New York, Los Angeles, Chicago, and Miami—attracted more legal immigrants. Unlike the top

four, however, the capital drew newcomers not predominantly from any few countries or regions, but from around the globe.

The capital's new immigrants came from a remarkably diverse set of countries—193 in all (see figure 1). El Salvador sent the most immigrants Washington's way—some 25,000 people, or roughly 10 percent of the entire group. Nine countries—Vietnam, India, China, the Philippines, South Korea, Ethiopia, Iran, Pakistan, and Peru—combined sent 40 percent.

Together with El Salvador,


they make up half the new arrivals. These top 10 countries are found, literally, all over the map: Central America, South America, Southeast Asia, East Asia, South Asia, the Middle East, and Africa. Overall, 42 percent of recent immigrants to the Washington area came from Asia, 32 percent from Latin America and the Caribbean, 16 percent from Africa, and the remaining 10 percent from Europe, Oceania, and Canada. The mix, in other words, is truly global.

In many U.S. metro areas, immigrants cluster in ethnically homogeneous enclaves

and establish their first footholds in the city proper. Here again, Washington was exceptional. The new arrivals scattered throughout the region, and most (87 percent) chose to live in the suburbs. Indeed, almost half settled outside the Capital Beltway, which has traditionally demarcated older, urbanized communities from the newer communities.

The newcomers settled almost everywhere in the Washington region. Of 258 zip codes in the metropolitan area, two-thirds had 50 or more new arrivals. The 10 zip codes with the most new

Figure 1. New Immigrants in Metropolitan Washington by Country of Origin, 1990–98



Audrey Singer is a visiting fellow at the Brookings Center on Urban and Metropolitan Policy. Samantha Friedman is assistant professor of sociology, Ivan Cheung is assistant professor of geography, and Marie Price is associate professor of geography at the George Washington University. This article is drawn from a longer paper written for the Brookings Urban Center.

immigrants each drew from more than 100 countries, with three attracting newcomers from more than 130 countries.

Different groups had different settlement patterns. Asian immigrants (primarily from Vietnam, India, China, the Philippines, South Korea, Iran, Pakistan, Taiwan, Bangladesh, and Afghanistan) were more likely to move to the outer suburbs, with 56 percent of new Asian arrivals choosing to locate outside the Beltway in areas that have accounted for much of the region's job growth. Indian and Chinese immigrants were the most dispersed of the Asian immigrants. Vietnamese and Koreans were more likely to cluster, the former in the inner suburbs and the District of Columbia, the latter in the outer suburbs.

Latin American immigrants tended to live inside the Beltway. One-third came from El Salvador, followed by Peru, Bolivia, Jamaica, Guatemala, Nicaragua, Mexico, Trinidad and Tobago, the Dominican Republic, and Colombia. Mexicans, as it turned out, were underrepresented. Although they accounted for nearly 30 percent of all newcomers to the United States during 1990–98, they were only 1 percent of Washington's immigrants and only 4 percent of the Latin American newcomers.

Washington attracts the largest proportional flow of Africans of any major U.S. metropolitan area. The dominant source of immigrants is Ethiopia, followed by Nigeria, Ghana, Sierra Leone, and Somalia. Like their counterparts from Latin America, African immigrants tend to live within the Beltway. Although African immigrants are found in the majority of the area's zip codes, they are more concentrated, particularly in some suburban areas where African Americans are the majority. ■

Table 1. Ranking of Metro Areas by Different Indexes

METRO AREA	MILKEN TECH POLE	GAY INDEX	BOHEMIAN INDEX	FOREIGN- BORN INDEX	COMPOSITE DIVERSITY INDEX
San Francisco	1	1	8	4	2
Boston	2	8	9	9	6
Seattle	3	6	1	15	5
Washington	4	2	6	10	3
Dallas	5	19	15	16	15
Los Angeles	6	7	2	2	1
Chicago	7	15	20	7	11
Atlanta	8	4	13	31	14
Phoenix	9	22	24	21	21
New York	10	14	3	3	4
Philadelphia	11	36	35	25	32
San Diego	12	5	18	6	7
Denver	13	10	14	29	17
Austin	14	3	10	19	8
Houston	15	21	30	8	18

Sources: "Tech-Pole" ratings from *America's High-Tech Economy* (Milken Institute, July 1999); gay index, bohemian index, foreign-born index, and composite diversity index constructed by Richard Florida and Gary J. Gates using data from 1990 U.S. Decennial Census Public Use Microdata Sample (5%)

designers) in a metropolitan area. The third—the foreign-born index—measures the share of immigrants in a metro area. The fourth—the composite diversity index—is a sum of the rankings of the other three.

To see how well more and less diverse metro areas stack up with fast-growing high-tech areas, we compare our indices with the Milken Institute's "Tech Pole," a measure of high-technology industry concentration and growth, developed in a July 1999 study titled *America's High-Tech Economy*. Using 1998 data, the Tech Pole measures a city's "gravitational pull" on high-tech industries. It ranks metropolitan areas based on a combination of two factors: an area's high-tech industry output expressed as a share of U.S. high-tech industry output and a ratio of an area's high-tech industry output to U.S. high-tech industry output. The first measure favors large metropolitan areas; the second, small cities with large technology sectors. By combining the two, the Tech Pole favors neither.

Gays and Growth

Perhaps our most striking finding is that a leading indicator of a metropolitan area's high-technology success is a large gay population. Frequently cited as a harbinger of

redevelopment and gentrification in distressed urban neighborhoods, the presence of gays in a metro area signals a diverse and progressive environment and provides a barometer for a broad spectrum of amenities attractive to adults, especially those without children. To some extent, the gay and lesbian population represents what might be called the "last frontier" of diversity in our society.

As table 1 shows, 11 of the top 15 high-tech metropolitan areas (column 1) also appear in the top 15 of the gay index (column 2). The five metro areas with the highest concentration of gay residents—San Francisco, Washington, Austin, Atlanta, and San Diego—are all among the nation's top 15 high-tech areas. In our statistical analyses, the gay index does better than other individual measures of social and cultural diversity as a predictor of high-tech location. The correlations are exceedingly high and consistently positive and significant. The results of a variety of multivariate regression analyses support this finding. The gay index is positively and significantly associated with the ability of a region both to attract talent and to generate high-tech industry.

Gays predict not only the concentration of high-tech industry, but also its growth, as we found when we compared our gay index

with the Milken Institute Tech-Growth Index, which measures growth in output of high-tech industries within metropolitan areas from 1990 to 1998 relative to the national growth rate in output of high-tech industries during the same period. Five of the cities in the top 10 in the Tech-Growth Index also rank in the top 10 for the gay index. What's more, the correlation between the gay index (measured in 1990) and the Milken Tech-Growth Index increases over time, suggesting that the benefits of diversity may actually compound as time goes on by increasing a region's high-tech prosperity.

To counter the possibility that the influence of San Francisco (which ranks first on both the high-tech and gay indices) creates a false association between the two measures, we repeated the analyses without San Francisco. That second analysis strengthened slightly the influence of the gay index on high-tech growth, increasing our confidence that the concentration of gays predicts high-tech concentration and growth.

Bohemians and Immigrants

High concentrations of "bohemians" are also strongly linked to a metropolitan area's high-technology success, as our bohemian index shows (table 1, column 3). Ten of the top 15 bohemian metro areas also rank among the nation's top 15 high-tech areas, notably Seattle, Los Angeles, New York, Washington, San Francisco, and Boston.

It has long been thought that talented people are attracted to amenities such as restaurants, museums, symphonies, art galleries, and a vibrant street-level culture. Our bohemian index offers considerable improvement over traditional measures of amenities that make for popular cities, because it provides a direct measure of the producers of those amenities that support and showcase creativity and artistic expression.

Metropolitan areas with high concentrations of immigrants also rank high as technology centers. In Silicon Valley, the world's leading high-tech center, nearly a quarter of the population is foreign-born. As noted elsewhere in this issue by AnnaLee Saxenian, a large share of Silicon Valley's high-tech scientists and engineers hail from foreign countries. Earlier research by Saxenian found that roughly a quarter of new Silicon Valley businesses established since 1980 had a Chinese or Indian-born founder. That figure increased to more than 30 percent between 1995 and 1999. The actual extent of immigrant influence may be even greater, because firms with a non-Asian co-founder are not counted.

The correlation between the Tech-Pole index and our foreign-born index (column 4) is also strong. Nine of the top 15 (and 8 of the top 10) metropolitan areas with the largest share of foreign-born residents were also among the nation's top 15 high-technology areas: Los Angeles, New York, San Francisco, San Diego, Chicago, Houston, Boston, Washington, and Seattle.

Overall Diversity

Our argument about diversity is simple and straightforward. Diversity of human capital is a key component of the ability to attract and retain high-tech industry. When we summed the

rankings of our three diversity indices to make our composite diversity index (CDI), the result strongly correlated with the Milken Tech-Pole ranking. As column 5 of the table demonstrates, the top 11 metro areas on the CDI are also among the top 15 Milken Tech-Pole regions. The statistical correlation between the Tech Pole and CDI is higher than the correlation between the Tech Pole and any of our individual diversity measures, and higher than that between the Tech Pole and simpler measures such as the share of college graduates in the population.

Even more compelling, the CDI strongly predicts high-tech growth, as we learned by comparing it with the Milken Institute's Tech-Growth Index. When we estimated the effect of the CDI on high-tech growth and factored in the share of college graduates in the region, population, and measures of culture, recreation, and climate, we found that our diversity measure has a positive and significant effect on high-tech growth from 1990 to 1998. These results offer strong evidence of the importance of the combined effects of social, cultural, and ethnic diversity for both high-tech location and growth.


Attracting Talent

Tolerance and diversity clearly matter to high-tech concentration and growth. Having large representations of gays or bohemians or immigrants in a population does not, of course, directly cause a technology industry to spring up. Instead, people in technology businesses appear to be drawn to places characterized by inclusiveness, open-mindedness, and cultural creativity—attributes whose presence is often signaled by, and therefore strongly correlate with, a cosmopolitan and diverse local population. The point isn't that high-tech jobs follow gays; it's that gays and high-tech jobs both gravitate to the same kinds of places.

Austin, Texas, like many other university towns that aspire to high-tech growth, has made the traditional investments in research and development and business incubation with major facilities like Sematech and MCC. But Austin has also invested heavily in its lifestyle and music scene—from the clubs and bars of Sixth Street to Austin City Limits and the South-by-Southwest film and music festival. When a high-tech company, Vignette, recently expanded into a new facility downtown, part of its deal was to establish a million-dollar fund to support the local music scene. Austin Mayor Kirk Watson has been the driving force behind a strategy that aims to capitalize on the "convergence" between technology, talent, and tolerance, as he puts it.

There's a message here for cities. Talent powers economic growth, and diversity and openness attract talent. Companies remain important but no longer call the shots. The location decisions of people are just as important—maybe even more so. In fact, companies increasingly will go where talented people are.

Building a vibrant technology-based region requires more than investing in R&D, supporting entrepreneurship, and generating venture capital. It requires creating an environment that attracts talented people. From the evidence, that seems to mean opening the doors to as wide a range of people as possible. ■



he daily schedule of any secretary of state or national security adviser attests to America's ethnic diversity. Interspersed with interminable staff meetings and appointments with visiting foreign dignitaries are sessions with domestic ethnic groups. It might be a breakfast talk with officials from the Cuban American National Foundation on U.S. policy toward Cuba, a luncheon address to members of the American Latvian Association on NATO expansion, or an evening speech to the American Jewish Committee on the Middle East peace process. In America, global politics is local politics—and local politics, often, is ethnic politics.

ADALBERTO ROQUE/AFP

Getting Uncle Sam's

Ear

By James M. Lindsay

Will Ethnic Lobbies Cramp America's Foreign Policy Style?

James M. Lindsay is a senior fellow in the Brookings Foreign Policy Studies program.

None of this is new, of course. Irish Americans lobbied 19th-century presidents to endorse Irish autonomy, and they joined with German Americans in pressing Woodrow Wilson to keep the United States out of World War I. Still, with the Soviet Union no longer around to give direction to U.S. foreign policy and with immigrants now arriving in America from every corner of the globe, ethnic lobbies are playing a more visible role in policymaking. In the eyes of critics, the United States has been worse off for it. Increasingly, some observers fear, American foreign policy will be driven—and often fragmented—by the pressures of small groups with intense interests.

September 11 appears to have tempered these fears, at least momentarily, by giving U.S. foreign policy a clear sense of direction for the first time since the Berlin Wall fell. Even so, ethnic lobbies will continue to shape American policy abroad. But the story of ethnic influence is more complicated, and more interesting, than it may at first appear. On balance, ethnic groups matter, but not nearly as much or as often as people might suspect. Within the ethnic universe, however, some groups will grow in influence, while others will decline. It is already possible, indeed, to glimpse who the winners and losers may be. And there is reason to think that U.S. foreign policy itself will, in the end, be among the winners.

New Kids on the Block

For a country that draws its citizens literally from around the globe, the United States is host to remarkably few ethnic foreign policy lobbies. One looks in vain, for example, for Dutch, French Canadian, Italian, or Norwegian lobbies. And their absence cannot be explained by size or geographic dispersion. Each of these immigrant communities is far larger than those from, say, Greece or Cuba and is, like them, concentrated in

a few U.S. states where they could make their electoral clout felt.

The truth is that ethnic groups weigh in on foreign policy matters only when conditions are right. Immigrants who came to the United States as political exiles (think Cubans) are much more likely to try to influence policy toward their ancestral homeland than those who came to find a better life (think French Canadians or Italians). Ethnic groups whose real or symbolic ancestral homelands are threatened by their neighbors (think Armenia, Greece, or Israel) are also more likely to lobby than those who come from countries that are secure (think Norway or Portugal). And it is no coincidence that prominent lobbies like Armenian Americans, Cuban Americans, Greek Americans, and Jewish Americans represent the most economically successful

For a country that draws its citizens literally from around the globe, the United States is host to remarkably few ethnic foreign policy lobbies.

American ethnic groups. Impoverished ethnic groups are usually too focused on their own plight to worry about those they have left behind.

Economic hardship, together with the lack of either an exile mentality or a threat, explains why, Cuban Americans aside, Latino organizations usually sit on the sidelines of foreign policy. Groups such as the National

Council of La Raza and the Mexican American Legal Defense and Educational Fund have concentrated their focus on the economy, civil rights, and immigration because those are the issues that matter to their members. Given the economic challenges facing the Hispanic community today and the relative security that most Latin American countries enjoy, foreign policy is not likely to galvanize Latinos any time soon.

What about other immigrant groups? One likely to be active in coming years is Indians. Not only does India face military threats—from both Pakistan and China—but Indian Americans are one of the most affluent ethnic groups in the

United States. They have become active in politics, contributing an estimated \$8 million to federal election campaigns over the past three elections. Congress has taken notice. The Congressional India Caucus, founded in 1993, now has more than 120 members, nearly double that of the Congressional Study Group on Germany.

The Chinese-American community presents a different case. Historically, Chinese Americans, like Latinos, have been quiet on foreign policy. In their case, economics has not been a major barrier—Chinese Americans have prospered. Rather, what is lacking is a policy around which they can mobilize. China is not threatened, and unlike Cuban Americans, most Chinese Americans do not see themselves as political exiles and do not push for the overthrow of the communist government. Moreover, Chinese Americans are divided over whether to promote trade with China or to pressure Beijing to improve its human rights record.

Whether other Asian-American groups will form significant foreign policy lobbies will depend to a considerable extent on how China behaves. A belligerent China will give Korean Americans, Vietnamese Americans, and Cambodian Americans reasons to mobilize. But if China is more pacific, U.S. relations with each of these countries will be more or less “normal,” and the need to reshape U.S. policy to protect ethnic interests will decline.

Who Wins, Who Loses?

Concerns that new ethnic lobbies will capture U.S. policy toward their ancestral homelands are longstanding. Yet just as their willingness to take on foreign policy is exaggerated, so too is their ability to get their way.

Consider the Jewish-American lobby. No one doubts that it helps shape U.S. policy toward the Middle East. But it does not have an unbroken record of success. The United States sells high-tech weaponry to neighboring Arab states, pushes Israel to trade land for peace, and refuses to move the U.S. embassy from Tel Aviv to Jerusalem.

And the Jewish-American lobby is in



many ways an exception. Most other ethnic lobbies have far less impressive track records. The East European lobby failed in the 1950s and 1960s to persuade successive administrations to roll back Soviet gains in Eastern Europe, and while it pressed for NATO expansion during the 1990s, it was far from pivotal in the decision to expand. The Greek lobby had brief success in persuading Congress to impose an arms embargo on Turkey, and the Armenian lobby has made Armenia one of the highest per capita recipients of U.S. aid, but neither has disrupted close U.S. security ties with the Turkish government. The Serbian lobby had no impact on U.S. policy toward the Balkans in the 1990s. In short, ethnic lobbying does not translate automatically into policy influence.

So when are ethnic lobbies likely to get their way? That depends on both the characteristics of the lobby itself and the broader political context in which it operates. On the internal side of the ledger what matters is a community's size, commitment, unity, resources, and most important, its political skill or ability to make effective use of the first four qualities. The Jewish-American lobby scores high on all counts. By contrast, the Arab-American lobby has been hobbled over the years by national and religious divisions.

The broader political factors that influence an ethnic lobby's effectiveness begin with whether it wants to preserve or to overturn the status quo. Preserving it is far easier—a lobby prevails if it wins at any step of the political process. For instance, cracks have developed in recent years in support for the four-decades-old embargo on Havana—a policy, by the way, that predates the rise of the Cuban-American lobby—as Midwestern farmers have sought access to Cuba's market. Yet the embargo has remained essentially intact because the Cuban-American lobby has maintained the support of House Republican leaders.

A second broad political factor is whether other powerful interests support or oppose an ethnic lobby's aims. The Jewish lobby succeeds partly because it is pushing on an open door—it advocates policies that most Americans favor on the merits. Israel is a stable, pro-Western democracy in a region where governments are often unstable, autocratic, and anti-American. Conversely, Armenian Americans cannot persuade Congress to criticize Turkey for refusing to apologize for the Armenian genocide during and after World War I because oil companies, defense contractors, and the U.S. military have joined to fend off a policy that jeopard-

dizes their considerable interests in Ankara. Serbian Americans found almost no allies for their call for giving Belgrade a more sympathetic hearing.

Finally, events abroad matter. Castro's hatred of the United States has strengthened the hand of the Cuban-American lobby. Had Havana sought a rapprochement with Washington, Cuban Americans might not have been able to fight off efforts to keep the Cuban embargo in place. The Greek lobby was most powerful in the 1970s when Turkey's invasion of Cyprus made it politically harder to defend pro-Turkish policies. The September 11 terrorist attacks and their aftermath may redefine the political terrain for both the Arab-American and Jewish-American lobbies. Much will depend on whether the lesson

Americans draw from these events is that the United States has been too unquestioning in its support of Israel, or that America's Arab allies will not come to its aid in its hour of need, or that the Middle East is too dangerous to merit further U.S. engagement.

Which of the new ethnic lobbies look to be winners? One group likely to emerge as a political powerhouse is Indian Americans. Not only are they affluent and interested in India, but China's rising power and India's decision to move toward a market economy means their calls for a more "India friendly" foreign policy are likely to meet a receptive audience in Washington. Pakistani Americans no doubt will try to prevent a tilt toward India, and the war in Afghanistan has given Islamabad renewed geopolitical importance in Washington. But Pakistani Americans will labor under two disadvantages—they are only one-tenth the size of the Indian-American community, and Pakistan's military government maintains close ties to China.

The potential for worsening U.S. relations with China is a major reason a Chinese-American lobby is unlikely to be influential. Again, Chinese Americans tend to favor engaging Beijing rather than isolating it. Should China act more aggressively, as its critics contend it will,

Chinese Americans will find it hard to sustain a conciliatory policy toward Beijing. They (and their supporters) will find themselves vulnerable to politically damaging charges that they are aiding America's adversary—a charge that could resonate given that one out of four Americans harbors “very negative attitudes” toward Chinese Americans and one out of three doubts their loyalty to the United States. A more belligerent China would also strengthen the hand of other Asian ethnic groups that oppose demands for conciliatory policies. Conversely, if U.S.–Chinese relations follow a cooperative path in the years to come, the incentive for Chinese Americans to inject themselves into foreign policy debates will diminish.

What about the Latino lobby? Although Hispanic groups are likely to focus on domestic issues rather than foreign policy ones, the tremendous size of the Latino community means that a Hispanic lobby could be formidable when it does take up foreign policy issues. The open question is whether a Latino lobby can maintain a united political front. Issues that galvanize Salvadoran Americans may not arouse Cuban or Mexican Americans. Even within national groupings divisions may emerge. The once-solid Cuban-American lobby now appears to be fracturing along generational lines, with younger Cuban Americans turning away from their parents' unforgiving hardline policies. Likewise, Mexican Americans could fracture along regional lines or, assuming that Mexico becomes a vibrant multiparty democracy, perhaps even along ideological lines.

It is also possible that some small ethnic communities may come to dominate U.S. policy toward their homeland. Somali-American groups might carve out a powerful role on U.S. policy toward Mogadishu, or Hmong Americans might take control of policy toward Vientiane. But given the small number of voters such groups represent, their power will largely reflect the fact that no one else cares about U.S. relations with their ancestral homeland rather than any magical sway they might have over foreign policy.

Whom Will Ethnic Lobbies Represent?

Ethnic lobbies have passionate critics because of the lurking suspicion that they put the interests of their ancestral homeland before those of the United States. It is impossible to say whether this claim is true. The national interest and the best means for promoting it are not objective facts. Reasonable people can disagree over whether U.S. support for Israel is excessive, whether Washington should tilt toward Ankara or Athens, or whether NATO expansion makes sense. For that reason, the charge that an ethnic lobby puts its own interests ahead of the national interest can be (and have been) leveled against any lobby, be it the Cuban American National Foundation, the National Association of Manufacturers, or the AFL-CIO.

What is clear is that many foreign governments hope to use ethnic lobbies to influence U.S. policy. Visiting Armenian, Greek, Israeli, and Mexican officials routinely meet with fellow ethnics to enlist their support. Dominican President Fernandez Reyna once went so far as to encourage Dominicans in the United States to become U.S. citizens so they can vote, and presumably influence Washington's attitudes toward the Dominican Republic. At the same time, it is likely that some ethnic activists worry more about the interests of their ancestral homeland than about those of the United States.

Still, concerns that ethnic lobbies sacrifice U.S. interests can easily be overblown and usually are. To begin with, policies that benefit other countries do not necessarily harm the United States and may even help it. One need not belong to the American Israel Public Affairs Committee to believe that supporting Israel serves U.S. interests or be Lithuanian to favor expanding NATO. Nor do ethnic lobbies march lockstep with their fellow ethnics abroad. During the 1980s, for instance, many Jewish groups had testy relations with Jerusalem because of intense disagreements over Israel's policies. On NAFTA and related issues Mexican-American groups have been more interested in how policies affect Mexicans

living north of the border than south of it. Nor is there evidence that Chinese Americans have been particularly interested in doing Beijing's bidding.

Finally, the focus on where the loyalties of ethnic lobbies lie misses the contributions that they make to U.S. foreign policy. The transmission belt that enables ethnic lobbies to inject foreign perspectives into American politics also operates, perhaps even more strongly, in the opposite direction. As the political scientist Yossi Shain argues in *Marketing the American Creed Abroad*, ethnic lobbies are instrumental in disseminating American values and interests in their ancestral homelands. They frequently press ancestral governments to accommodate themselves to American political realities and hold them to American standards on everything from human rights to good governmental practices to economic policy. For that reason the consequence of America's growing Latino community may be as much the “Americanization” of Latin America (or parts of it) as it is the “Latinization” of America. Likewise, Arab Americans and Muslim Americans may play a crucial role in blunting anti-Americanism in the Arab and Islamic worlds.

None of this is to say that ethnic lobbies don't complicate the lives of policy-makers. They do, at least when they oppose what an administration or Congress wants to do. (Often overlooked is that policymakers frequently find ethnic lobbies useful allies. The Clinton administration actively recruited Latino groups—which had been spectators—into lobbying for NAFTA's passage. It also used Eastern-European groups to secure Senate approval of NATO expansion.) What it does say is that ethnic lobbies confront the same constraints that all interests groups do. And while the end of the Cold War means greater societal influence on foreign policy, that holds true for all interest groups, many of which have agendas at odds with those of ethnic lobbies. As a result, the appearance of new ethnic lobbies will undoubtedly change some policies; but, in the main, the end result of ethnic lobbying will be not so much to capture American foreign policy as to enrich it. ■



JEFFREY KIBLER

DIVERSITY

in Israel

By Robert Litan

Lessons for the United States

As the United States copes with large immigration flows and increasing diversity in these highly uncertain times, it may want to look to an unusual model country—Israel—for some fresh ideas about taking full advantage of diversity.

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In Israel, the majority of the population, or their parents, were born in other countries. Though most Israeli immigrants are Jewish, they are extraordinarily disparate in their origins and cultures. Not all Israelis are immigrants. Roughly one million people, many of whom are Arabs of Muslim faith, come from families who lived in Israel before it was formally declared a state in 1948. Learning to live with, accommodate, and respect the deep divides among them has been a challenge to Israel's people.

The nation's experiment in "Jewish pluralism" has been remarkably successful, particularly given the extraordinary challenges facing the nation from outside its borders. Its parallel experiment in Arab-Jewish pluralism has been notably less successful. Nonetheless, Israel has managed to develop, at least among its highly diverse Jewish majority, a thriving, pluralistic democracy and a strong economy. And it has achieved a relatively high standard of living for most of its people—even for Israeli Arabs, if one compares them with their Palestinian, Egyptian, and Jordanian neighbors. Its success should therefore attract interest from other pluralistic societies that also confront challenges to continued social cohesion.

Israel's Divisions

One set of divisions within Israel is that between segments of the Jewish majority—between longer-term residents and more recent arrivals, between secular and religious Jews, between Jews of vastly different cultural and national backgrounds.

Although Israel was founded as a homeland for Jews and although key features of Israeli civil law—marriage, divorce, and burial—are governed by religious norms, most Jewish Israelis are not religious in the sense of regularly observing Jewish rituals. Many of the nation's one million Russian immigrants are not Jewish at all. At the other extreme, some 10 percent of Israel's people, the Haredi group, are deeply religious. The ritually observant Haredim wear distinctive clothing, and Haredi men often do not work, instead studying religious texts throughout the week. They are also exempt from military service. Tensions between the Haredi and secular Jews sometimes run high. The Shinui Party, headed for extinction not long ago, picked up an impressive six seats in the Knesset in 1999 elections largely on the basis of its campaign slogan, "Keep the Haredi from taking over the country."

Another divide in Israel is that between Ashkenazi Jews (those of European and American heritage) and Sephardi Jews (those of Asian-African background). For much of the state's existence, the wealthier, better educated Ashkenazim have dominated its economic and political institutions through the Labour party. The Ashkenazi hold on the country has been weakening, however, as disaffected Sephardim allied themselves first with the Likud party in 1977 and more recently with the Sephardi-Haredi party, Shas. During the 1950s, the two groups had rough numerical parity. By the 1960s, higher birth rates among Sephardim tilted the balance in their favor. Recent immigration from the former Soviet Union has restored rough equilibrium between the two ethnic groups.



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Israel's second, more pressing challenge regarding diversity is to give Arab citizens sufficient stake in the society that they will not revolt and find common cause with Israel's external enemies or aggravate tensions, already at hair-trigger level, with the Palestinians. Israel's Arab minority has lived apart from and in an uneasy truce with Israel's other citizens. Though Israel has not treated its Arab minority as fairly or as equitably as it might have, even here Israel's experience may provide a beacon of hope to countries with much less pressing challenges. After all, security issues aside—for Arab citizens have strong and understandable emotional ties with the Arab countries surrounding Israel—Israeli authorities have made at least some attempt to integrate Israeli Arabs into the wider society. Until 1966, Arab citizens lived under military rule in their own separate towns, which they could not leave without special permits. When the military administration was abolished, Arabs began moving out of farming and into jobs in manufacturing and construction, allowing the two peoples to begin to mix in commercial activity, though they remained very much apart in social and cultural affairs. The economic position of the Arab population has improved, but it still falls well short of that of Jewish citizens. Arab political parties have gained influence in the Knesset and are now critical voting blocs in the continuing struggle for power between Likud and Labour.

Immigrant Absorption Programs

Unlike immigrants to other developed countries, who must apply separately for citizenship, immigrants to Israel automatically become citizens. Israel thus has every incentive to integrate them socially, culturally, and linguistically. And it does

just that. Upon their arrival in Israel, immigrants are offered language training, housing, job search assistance, and, for their first several months, economic support.

From its founding as a state, Israel has also required military service—not just for the young or for men only (though women serve for a shorter time and largely in noncombat positions). The primary goal is national security, but the collateral benefits have been considerable. The military has become the central means of imparting Israeli values and culture, as well as the Hebrew language, to Jewish immigrants who pour into the country. So strong are the ties formed in the Army that those who do not serve or are exempted from serving (in the case of Israeli Arabs, for example) are in most cases effectively locked out of the upper reaches of Israeli business and society.

A recent weakening in the military service requirement has entailed a loss of some social “glue.” Today less than 60 percent of Israeli men are drafted. As more citizens are exempted from service, those who serve bear a growing resentment toward those who do not, especially the Haredi sector.

Lessons for the United States

The surge of immigration to the United States over the past several decades may offer unprecedented challenges to America’s traditional respect for pluralism and tolerance. Although the September terrorist attacks have generated a strong wave of national unity and patriotism, *neither the public nor political leaders should take such cohesion for granted indefinitely.* If one lesson stands out from Israeli immigration policy, it is this: nations that are serious about wanting more immigrants but nonetheless worried about their socioeconomic ability to absorb them can minimize potential tensions through comprehensive immigrant absorption programs.

The U.S. government may hesitate to adopt such policies to avoid the charge that it is unfairly favoring new arrivals over natives with low living standards. Nevertheless, as the United States takes in more immigrants—which it will continue to do notwithstanding the events of September—it may want to consider moving toward more comprehensive absorption policies.

At a minimum, government could give more effort to ensuring that immigrants learn English. Language instruction, funded by Washington, could be delivered directly by state and local governments or indirectly by private groups through vouchers. Learning English should not be viewed as punishment, but instead as acquiring an essential tool for functioning in a new society. For a nation receiving immigrants from all over the globe, teaching all students in English would appear to be critical to assuring that as they become adults, all citizens have a minimum of shared experience and knowledge to continue functioning in a cohesive, but pluralistic, society. And because being able to speak and write in English is essential for all but low-skilled jobs, English training would help improve the living standards of many low-income immigrants.


Faith-Based Delivery of Social Services

The Israeli experience in delivering social services through nongovernmental, and especially religious, institutions may offer guidance to the Bush administration and Congress as they craft any “faith-based” social service initiative to remove existing legal barriers to religious organizations receiving government aid for promoting social welfare.

In the years before Israel adopted its version of “faith-based” social services, religious institutions in both the Arab and Jewish sectors avoided relations with municipal or central government authorities and, largely out of an effort to build and maintain their own constituencies, delivered their services separately. Like the Bush administration, however, Israeli society developed a reasonably strong consensus that nongovernmental organizations can deliver social services well—perhaps better than government can. Moreover, to the extent they are funded from private parties as well as government, these organizations can—and do—add to the overall level of resources aimed at social services.

But mixing social service delivery with political operations can have its drawbacks, particularly when nongovernmental groups can use their control over the delivery of services to recruit and maintain membership and political support. Today, for example, Shas, the Sephardi-Haredi party, stands out as an active nongovernmental organization performing religious and social service functions, primarily in education. In the Arab sector, the “Islamic Movement” and its organization play an influential role in the religious, social, social service, educational, and political realms. But both Shas and the “Islamic Movement” use their systems and organizations to advance their partisan political agendas, to no less an extent (and at times a greater extent) than their social goals.

The likelihood that faith-based service delivery systems “work better”—that is, produce better outcomes at the same or even lower cost—than government-administered social programs must thus be weighed against the possibility that relying on nongovernmental (especially religious) institutions can fragment society, especially if the groups with which they are identified or affiliated fail to show tolerance for members of other groups with whom they may not agree.



take place in a group setting. Those serving in the civilian program would live away from home, in dormitory settings, much like those who now serve in the military. Moreover, unlike many current community service programs in which students from moderate and higher income families deliver services to local residents of the same socioeconomic status, the program should aim to deliver benefits to more disadvantaged populations.

For many people, their year in compulsory service may be the only time in their lives where they mix for an extended time and on an equal footing with others from very different backgrounds. Although nonmilitary service may be less intense than serving in the armed forces, it could help young Americans develop a deeper understanding and appreciation for others at a time in their lives—just after high school (or college or graduate school) graduation—when their adult personalities are forming and their future career choices may be made.

Indeed, the relative lack of diversity in many American public schools strengthens the case for compulsory service. Inner-city public schools in many large metropolitan areas are populated predominantly by African-American and other minority students, while suburban schools enroll students from upper middle-class and, often, white families. Even in colleges where students may come from many different backgrounds, young people do not necessarily rub shoulders with others different from themselves. In any event, the college environment tends to be competitive and to reward individual performance rather than group or cooperative endeavors.

Mandatory service would surely arouse strong opposition. Some would criticize its large potential for make-work, others its curtailment of individual freedom. Organized labor may object that those serving in the program would perform functions now undertaken by paid workers. Furthermore, service would involve public costs—roughly \$25 billion annually (some 2.5 million high school graduates a year times \$10,000 in annual support costs), according to one estimate. The young men and women in service would also incur costs by delaying for one year their entry either into college or into the labor force, which would reduce (modestly) their lifetime incomes.

Accordingly, a more politically palatable alternative may be a substantial expansion of the AmeriCorps program, as Senator John McCain has proposed. Initially an opponent of AmeriCorps, McCain has since praised its successes and suggested that the nation build on them. His proposal contemplates an expanded program in which volunteers from various socioeconomic backgrounds live together in dormitories to build esprit de corps.

Looking Ahead

The demographic changes that lie ahead for the United States will pose a stiff test to the nation's commitment to pluralism and social cohesion. As we look for ways to meet this challenge, political leaders and voters could profit from learning how other societies have confronted similar challenges. Israel's experience, perhaps surprisingly, may offer exactly the kind of wisdom we may all be seeking. ■

Immigrants seeking citizenship should know more than just their new home country's language. They must understand its social mores, its history, its government. Nations now generally require applicants for citizenship to pass a rudimentary test of such knowledge, but here too, more instruction could be offered. If nations want their new arrivals to become better integrated with their societies, they must give them a core of knowledge to do that. In the United States immigrants are left to acquire such information on their own. There is little government support for teaching it, except for the children of illegal immigrants, who are entitled to attend primary and secondary school, but not to attend college here without a student or work visa.

Just as with language instruction, the government could provide the rough equivalent of high school civics courses, either directly or indirectly, to all immigrants who seek citizenship. Special night programs could be offered to immigrants who are busy earning a living each day—as well as to natives already in the work force who also want to upgrade their skills by returning to school.

Compulsory Service

Israel's experience also illustrates the value of a service requirement for all residents approaching maturity. Other developed countries, such as Switzerland and Germany, also require their male high school graduates to serve for a time in the military. The terrorist attack on September 11 may make mandatory service more politically palatable to Americans than it would otherwise have been.

Compulsory service brings together people from all walks of life during crucial formative years and puts them in a common environment where they have no choice but to get along with each other. It also helps instill a sense of obligation to the larger society.

Compulsory service need not mean military service. It can also take the form of community service (assisting the disadvantaged, serving as teacher's aides, and the like) in a much expanded version of the AmeriCorps program. U.S. society has already made some movement in this direction. Many high schools now require all students to perform "community service" during their years in high school. A national universal service requirement would be considerably more demanding. It would involve something like a year of service and would

Religion

By Gregg Easterbrook

America

The New Ecumenicalism

he post office near my quiet street in quintessentially suburban Bethesda, Maryland, is about to change hands: it's going to become an ashram. The local ashram needs more space, so its managers negotiated with the Postal Service to take over the West Bethesda post office when mail carriers make a scheduled move to a new facility. Some doctors' groups bid for the building, and so did the 7-Eleven chain. But the Buddhists had the juice, and they won out.

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At some levels, this epitomizes the ongoing transformation of American religious demographics. Within driving distance of my home now stand a Hindu temple, a Sikh gurdwara, a Mormon temple, and several mosques. Other typical American communities, not just the downtown areas on the coasts, have similarly varied religious landscapes—and also offer places of worship for Jains, Wiccans, Zoroastrians, and others. The United States has become “the most religiously diverse nation in the world,” according to Harvard’s Diana Eck in her 2001 book, *The New Religious America*.

Today, Eck writes, the United States has more Muslims than Episcopalians, with Islamic faithful and worship houses increasing—at least 1,200 mosques—while several mainstream Protestant denominations are in mild decline. Depending on whose figures you use, Muslims have passed or are just about to

ian faith has flourished alongside rival beliefs. According to an April 2001 Gallup poll, 82 percent of Americans now describe themselves as Christian—down only a little from 89 percent in 1947, when Gallup began polling on this subject. In the same April 2001 poll, 10 percent put themselves into all non-Christian faith categories, and 8 percent said they were not believers. Christians outnumber adherents of all other beliefs by eight to one.

Moreover, since World War II, numbers for American Christianity are up. Media commentary tends to drum on attendance declines among the mainstream Protestant denominations such as the Episcopal and Presbyterian churches, which contracted throughout the 1970s and 1980s, though the losses stopped in the 1990s. (Detailed statistics on U.S. religious affiliations can be found at www.adherents.com.) But

That America could become religiously diverse while remaining basically Christian would surely have pleased the Founders. Most assumed as a matter of course that the new nation would be Christian. George Washington, for example, said in his farewell address that Christianity would be essential if the nation was to have moral character.

But the Founders abhorred the spiritual strife that had marred so much of Europe’s past, as well as the tyranny of state-imposed belief. The freedom of religion they had in mind, though, was to choose among Christian denominations or to reject Christianity and embrace no faith. When Thomas Jefferson wrote the Virginia Statute for Religious Freedom—which he called an achievement equal to writing the Declaration of Independence—his aim was to protect people’s freedom to revere Jesus in whatever way seemed fitting to



pass Jews as a share of the American population. Meanwhile, contends Eck, Los Angeles has become “the most complex Buddhist city in the world.” America has become “the most religiously diverse nation in the world” because essentially all the world’s faiths are now represented and tolerated here, whereas across much of the globe, one religion dominates or minority beliefs are suppressed. The Founders dreamed that America would be a land of spiritual freedom. Americans are now exercising that freedom to a degree perhaps unprecedented in history, and the Founders would be proud, if not bewildered, to hear that it is now respectable to be a witch.

Religious Freedom

The rise of plural beliefs in the United States should not suggest that Christianity is in decline. Far from it: the Christ-

though some liberal Christian denominations may be down, the faith’s traditional subsets are thriving, as is the share of Americans who view themselves as Christian.

Consider the population math. The 89 percent Christian share of the U.S. population just after World War II meant (treating children as having the same faiths as their parents) that America held about 130 million Christians. The 82 percent share of Christians in today’s much larger population means there are now about 230 million American Christians. One hundred million new Christians in just 50 years! This single figure swamps all other religious data for the contemporary United States and may swamp all religious data in the nation’s history, considering that adding the first 100 million Christians to the country’s population took roughly two centuries.

them and to prevent state legislatures from “establishing” any particular Christian denomination.

Thanks to the Founders’ instincts regarding separation of church and state, all faiths are flourishing in the United States. Attendance at religious services is higher here than in any other Western nation and by some measures higher than in any nation in the world. (It’s hard to know what to make of attendance figures for the countries that mandate faith.) Today 57 percent of Americans say they regularly attend a worship service. Membership in religious faiths has steadily increased as well. At the turn of the 20th century, 41 percent of Americans considered themselves a formal member of some faith. Today that share has grown to 70 percent.

Self-described faith membership is much lower in other Western nations

and observance lower still. Only 10 percent of people in the United Kingdom and Sweden regularly attend church, 15 percent in France and Germany, 20 percent in Italy, about 25 percent in Israel. Yet all these nations have official, or near-official, sanctioned religions.

Maybe religious observance is lower in Western Europe because of lingering memories of the bloody warfare faith has caused in the Old World, whereas North America was mainly spared the curse of killing in the name of religion. But at least as likely an explanation is that Americans accept faith because government has nothing to do with it. This may be an ominous sign for advocates of faith-based government spending; in the long run, anything that connects the state and religion may only dilute faith.

That helps explain some public ambivalence about President Bush's pro-

Al Gore endorsed faith-based funding unequivocally—to the mixed outlook that predominated by last summer, when proponents found themselves softening their proposals for fear of failing to carry even the Republican House.


Immigration

The rise in spiritual diversity in the United States corresponds to the current wave of non-European immigration. In 1924, in response to the Ellis Island influx of the late 19th and early

Hindu,
Buddhist,
Islamic, and
other beliefs
now flourish
here on free
soil, just as
Baptism once
did, and
before that
Methodism and
Congregationalism.

another Ellis Island era is upon us.

The new immigrants from Asia, South Asia, and Africa bring with them the religions of the East and the subcontinent—Hinduism, Buddhism, Islam, and the African interpretations of Christianity. Ellis Island era arrivals were either Christian or Jewish or masked their familiar faiths in the hope of assimilating. Today's immigrants are rarely Christian or Jewish and are pleased to find they are entering a nation where no one's faith need be masked. One example of the diversifying effects of immigration on faith



posed expansion of federal support for faith-based organizations. The best study, by the Pew Forum on Religion and Public Life, found that 75 percent favored the basic idea and yet that 78 percent opposed allowing government-funded religious groups to discriminate against those who violated tenets of their faith—an essential clause of the Bush proposal. More than three-quarters of Pew's respondents said religion could contribute to solving the country's problems. But 68 percent also worried that getting government "too involved" with spiritual organizations would be bad for faith.

Such ambivalence may be both a yellow flag to supporters of faith-based funding programs and one reason why the political standing of the idea slipped from its peak during the 2000 presidential campaign—when both Bush and

20th centuries, Congress severely restricted immigration. In 1965, Congress opened America's borders again, but the new law essentially unintentionally awarded almost all slots to non-Europeans, especially Asians, South Asians, South Americans, and Africans. Immigrants flocked through the open door. Today America accepts about one million legal immigrants each year—more than all other nations of the world combined. In the 2000 census, the foreign-born population hit 14 percent—its highest share since 1930, the end of the Ellis Island era. The peak, in 1910, was 14.7 percent; the low, in 1970, 4.7 percent. Today's legal immigrants do not arrive by tramp steamer wearing rags and change their names at Ellis Island; they tend to come in by jet wearing something with a Nike logo on it. But considered in terms of sheer numbers,

practice, from a 2001 study by the Hartford Institute for Religion Research: the percentage of U.S. places of worship that "always use piano or organ" has been in steady decline, from 89 percent in 1945 to 59 percent today, while the percentage that "always use drums or other percussion" has steadily risen to 30 percent.

Arriving here two centuries ago, many new Americans longed for the freedom to practice Christianity as they wished, without state interference. Today's newcomers long for the same spiritual freedom, but often to practice other faiths. Many new immigrants find, as European immigrants once did, that in the United States they can observe their faiths openly and with pride in a way that never would have been possible in their native lands. Hindu, Buddhist, Islamic, and other beliefs now flourish here on free soil, just as Baptism once

did and before that Methodism and Congregationalism.

Religious Tolerance

Statistics on spiritual adherence tell only part of the story. What about attitudes?

On questions of open prejudice, all trends seem favorable. No mainstream religious group in the United States is today subject to open bias, while even such controversial groups as the “Church” of Scientology and the Nation of Islam generally receive the benefit of the doubt regarding their claims to religious respect. About 2,000 respondents to a recent survey by the Pew Forum on Religion and Public Life had “favorable” impressions of almost all major faiths, including 65 percent favorable for American Muslims.

Here’s a telling indicator. In their classic sociological study of Middle American viewpoints, the authors of the

States the same hostility to Islam that they felt in their home nations. Much of the new mosque movement has striated into mosques for African Americans, mosques for South Asian Americans, and mosques for Arab Americans, with crossovers not necessarily welcome. The small but real Vietnamese crime underworld is often Buddhist, which mocks true Buddhism as much as the Catholic Mafia mocks true Christianity.

And of course tensions still flare. Groups such as the Mormons feel they are unfairly derided, so much so that many want to change the denomination’s name to one that makes it clearer Mormons are Christians. And many subsets snipe at each other continuously—Orthodox Christians and Catholics, Orthodox Jews and Reform and Conservative Jews, fundamentalist Protestants and mainstream Protestants, traditional Muslims and the Nation of Islam.

2001 Kaiser Foundation survey found that although today most Americans say they would not mind if a close family member married someone of a different race, fully 70 percent would object to a wedding with an atheist.

Momentary controversies over Islam aside, in America’s contemporary spiritual landscape, the dividing line is not between Christians and non-Christians, nor drawn along any religious perimeter. It is between believers and nonbelievers. Persons of faith of almost any stripe have begun to embrace each other as allies against the encroachment of pure secularism, philosophical positivism, and legal hostility toward belief in the public square. How else to account for the warm embrace by many Christians and even some Muslims of the vice-presidential candidacy of Joe Lieberman? How else to explain why Catholics and Christian evangelicals applauded when



1924 book *Middletown* (Muncie, Indiana) found that 94 percent of high school students agreed that “Christianity is the one true religion and all peoples should be converted to it.” Revisiting Muncie in 1999, sociologist Theodore Caplow found that only 42 percent agreed with that statement. Almost all respondents were Christian, as before, but far fewer felt theirs was the “one true” faith to which others must conform.

Diverse new religious groups are not, of course, necessarily models of edification. Many Hindus bring with them to the United

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If there’s one thing you do not want to be on the spiritual spectrum in today’s United States, it is an unbeliever. Just the word “atheist” has a negative connotation. Surveys show that Americans think atheists are likely to be less ethical than believers, though the world is full of sanctimonious religious phonies, while some atheistic humanists follow strict codes of ethics. In the Pew surveys the lowest “favorable” impression goes to atheists, at 34 percent. And a June

President Bush appointed as his adviser for bioethics and stem-cell issues Leon Kass, an observant (versus cultural) Jew? Kass makes Catholics and evangelicals feel comfortable because he is a believer; exactly what he believes is seen as less important than that he acknowledges a God.


As the number and variety of American religious affiliations continue to soar, the cultural divide may increasingly pit believers against nonbelievers; what you believe will be seen as less important than that you believe. This could make the 8 percent who acknowledge their atheism uncomfortable, even unhappy if public expressions of faith come back into fashion. But it might also allow the adherents of the nation’s many religions and denominations at last to see past their differences toward the common good that all faiths claim to seek. ■

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

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


What county-fair judge would give a blue ribbon to a so-so cherry pie? According to Tom Loveless and Paul DiPerna, that is exactly what the federal school pickers have done.


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